Price Formation in the Presence of International Private Food Quality Standard: The case of Kenyan French beans by Kariuki, Isaac Maina
  
 
The Institute for Agricultural Economics 
of the Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 
 
 
 
 
Price Formation in the Presence of International Private Food Quality Standard: The 
case of Kenyan French beans 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation  
submitted for the Doctoral Degree 
awarded by the Faculty of Agricultural and Nutritional Sciences 
of the 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 
 
 
submitted 
 
 
 
M.Sc Isaac Maina Kariuki 
 
 
 
 
Born in Kenya 
 
 
 
 
Kiel May, 2012 
Dean:      Prof. Dr. Karin Schwarz 
1. Examiner:    Prof. Dr. Jens-Peter Loy 
2. Examiner:   Prof. Dr. Thomas Herzfeld 
Day of Oral Examination:  12.07.2012 
 
  
ii 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my sons Kariúki and Ngatia, and my wife Wamúyú   
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed with the approval  
of the Faculty of Agricultural and Nutritional Sciences 
of the 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 
  
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank the following people and institutions for various roles played during the 
research process: 
 My family for putting up with my long hours behind the computer and absence during 
my trips abroad.  
 Prof. Dr. Jens-Peter Loy (Abteilung Marktlehre, University of Kiel) and Prof. Dr. 
Thomas Herzfeld (Department of Agricultural Policy, Leibnitz-Institute of 
Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) for valuable 
academic support.  
 Prof. Dr. Awudu Abdulai (Abteilung Ernӓhrungsӧkonomie, University of Kiel) and 
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Orth (Agribusiness & Food Marketing, University of Kiel) for being 
part of the dissertation committee.  
 Frau Kriegel (Secretary Marktlehre) and Frau Koch (Secretary, office of the Dean) for 
facilitating administrative requirements between the department and the faculty.  
 My colleagues Meike, Heike, Janine, Karen, Thore, Carsten, and Fabian for exciting 
company. Special thanks to Meike for translating the German summary. 
 Deutsche Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD, Bonn & Nairobi) for funding the 
fieldwork and my stay in Germany (11.2004-10.2007).  
 Kiel University and Egerton University for training facilities. 
 Smallholder producers in Mwea Tebere for allowing research enumerators to visit 
their homes and providing information. 
 
  
v 
 
 
Table of contents 
 
List of tables .............................................................................................................................. vi 
List of figures ........................................................................................................................... vii 
Summary ................................................................................................................................. viii 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
The role of non-land assets, farmer capacity and incentives in successful adoption of 
GlobalGAP certification: Lessons from Kenya’s smallholders perspective ............................ 14 
Farmgate private standards and price premium: Evidence from the GlobalGAP scheme in 
Kenya’s French beans marketing ............................................................................................. 40 
Empirical analysis of factors influencing choice of contractual form and frequency of contract 
renewal in the horticultural sector of developing economies: Kenya’s experience ................. 60 
Summary and Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 92 
Methodological Appendix ...................................................................................................... 100 
 
 
  
vi 
 
List of tables 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables by GGAP certification status ........ 27 
Table 2.2: Factors affecting successful adoption of GGAP certification ................................. 30 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the model variables with unconditional and conditional 
distribution of French beans prices (N=249) ............................................................................ 49 
Table 3.2: Determinants of French Beans’ Price ..................................................................... 50 
Table 4.2: Factors determining use of contracts by smallholders, 2006 .................................. 78 
Table 4.3: Determinants of contract renewals .......................................................................... 80 
Table A.1: Compliance with GlobalGAP requirements by farm structure (N=249) ............. 105 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for GlobalGAP requirements conditional on producer group 
certification status (N=100) .................................................................................................... 106 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics based on certification status and farm structure (N=249) .. 107 
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for the frequency of contract renewals ............................... 108 
Table A.5: Contract renewals conditional on price knowledge and payment mode .............. 108 
 
 
 
  
  
vii 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1: % share of Kenya’s French beans exports to total production by volume .............. 4 
Figure 1.2: Mwea Tebere showing some of the French beans growing areas ........................... 7 
Figure A.1: Distribution of contract renewals among French beans producers ..................... 107 
 
viii 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Private Qualitätsstandards für Nahrungsmittel, insbesondere GlobalGAP, dominieren 
mittlerweile den westlichen Lebensmitteleinzelhandel. Die Anforderungen von GlobalGAP an 
die Produzenten beinhalten Investitionen in die landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe, 
Rückverfolgbarkeit und eine Zertifizierung. Trotz des Nutzens hinsichtlich Qualität, 
Sicherheit, Gesundheit, Wohlfahrt und Umwelt ist die Erfüllung der Anforderungen 
kostspielig für Kleinbetriebe und ein Preisaufschlag ist nicht beobachtbar. Auf alternativen 
Absatzmärkten werden Qualitäts- und Sicherheitsrisiken mittels Verträgen reduziert,  wobei 
aber Nutzung und Häufigkeit der Vertragsverlängerungen bis jetzt unerklärt sind. Die drei 
Arbeiten, die auf Daten von Produzenten für grüne Bohnen basieren, untersuchen neben der 
Umsetzung von GlobalGAP den Effekt von GlobalGAP auf die Erzeugerpreise, sowie die 
Nutzung und Häufigkeit von  Vertragsverlängerungen. Die Ergebnisse der ersten Arbeit 
zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Umsetzung von GlobalGAP mit steigenden 
Erzeugerpreisen, der Zunahme der Anzahl der Produzenten in einem Dorf und einer kurzen, 
überwachten Versorgungsketten sinkt. Sie steigt aber, wenn Schutzvorrichtungen, 
genossenschaftliche Organisationen und Beratungsstellen vorhanden sind. Das bedeutet, dass 
Preisanreize, eine unabhängige und überwachte Produktion die Umsetzung behindert, jedoch 
landwirtschaftliche Produktionsmittel, Kompetenzentwicklung der Landwirte und nicht-
monetäre Anreize die Umsetzung unterstützen.  Das in der zweiten Arbeit geschätzte 
ökonometrische Modell zeigt, dass die GlobalGAP Zertifizierung, der Gebrauch von 
Lieferverträgen, Direktbeschaffung durch Exporteure und die Größe des Marktes eines Dorfes 
einen positiven Effekt auf die Erzeugerpreise haben. Organisierte Erzeuger erzielen 
signifikant niedrigere Preise. Der GlobalGAP Preisaufschlag ist nicht sehr groß oder konstant 
über eine Saison. Auch ist er weniger wichtig in Lieferverträgen und bei der 
Direktbeschaffung. Es wird festgestellt, dass mehr Käufer in einem gegebenen Dorf, der 
nicht-wechselnde Verkauf an nur einen Käufer und bessere Straßenverhältnisse die 
Erzeugerpreise steigern. Die Ergebnisse der dritten Arbeit sind, dass mündliche Verträge mit 
höheren Erzeugerpreisen und vielen Erzeuger in einem Dorf assoziert sind, während 
Beratung, Gruppengröße, postprimäre Bildung und Vertragslaufzeit schriftliche Verträge 
differenzieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen außerdem, dass Vertragsverlängerungen mit den 
Preisen, wenn diese zum Zeitpunkt der Pflanzung bekannt sind, den Spotmarktpreisen, der 
Entfernung zur Quelle für Bewässerungswasser, der Produzenten-Exporteur 
Marktverbindung, sowie der Möglichkeit des Erhalts von Bestätigungen und der 
Nachverfolgbarkeit von Verkäufen zunehmen. Andererseits nehmen sie ab, wenn die Anzahl 
der Käufer in einem Dorf steigt. Diese Ergebnisse deuten an, dass alternative Absatzmärkte 
stark von mündlichen Verträgen abhängen, wohingegen die Vertragsverlängerungen mehr auf 
Zufriedenstellung, Vertrauen, Wechselkosten und Wettbewerb basiert. Alles in allem 
betrachtet, können Erzeugergruppen und nicht-monetäre Anreize effektiver sein, um 
Kleinbetriebe in private Qualitäts- und Sicherheitsstandards zu kooptieren. Neben anderen 
Vorteilen gibt es einen GlobalGAP Preisaufschlag, auch wenn dieser nicht sehr groß ist. 
Letztlich existieren alternative Absatzmärkte für Kleinbetriebe ohne GlobalGAP 
Zertifizierung durch Lieferverträge. 
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Summary 
 
Private food quality assurance standards especially GlobalGAP now dominate Western food 
retailers’ markets. GlobalGAP defines market access condition for producers requiring farm 
investments, traceability and certification. Despite quality, safety, health, welfare and 
environmental benefits, compliance is costly for smallholders yet a price premium is 
unobservable. Alternative markets mitigate quality and safety risks through contracts whose 
use and frequency of renewal is unexplained. Using data from French bean producers, three 
essays are presented: analysis of GlobalGAP adoption, its effect on producer prices, use and 
frequency of contracts renewal. In the first essay, results show that producer price, many 
producers in a village and short monitored supply chains reduce the likelihood but protective 
gear, collective organizations and extension services increase the likelihood of adoption. This 
means that price incentive, independent and monitored production constrains adoption but 
farm assets, farmer capacity and non-monetary incentives enhance adoption. In the second 
essay, the econometric model shows that GlobalGAP certification, use of supply contracts, 
direct procurement by exporters, and the size of markets in a village, have a positive effect on 
producer prices. Organized producers receive significantly lower prices. The GlobalGAP 
premium is not very large or constant over one season and is less important than in supply 
contracts and direct procurement. More buyers in a given village, non-switching selling to one 
buyer and better roads are found to increase prices paid to producers. The third essay finds 
that higher producer prices and many producers in a village are associated with oral contracts 
while extension, group size, post primary education and contract seasons with a buyer 
differentiate written contracts. Further, the results show that contract renewals increase with 
price if it is known at planting, spot cash payments, distance to irrigation water source, 
producer-exporter market linkage, sales receipting and traceability but reduce with the 
number of buyers in a village. The results indicate that alternative markets depend strongly on 
oral contracts while contract renewal is based more on satisfaction, trust, switching costs and 
competition. Overall, producer groups and non-monetary incentives may be a more effective 
way to co-opt smallholders in private quality and safety standards. Beside other benefits, there 
is a GlobalGAP certification premium though not very large. Finally, alternative markets exist 
for smallholders without GlobalGAP certification through supply contracts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Agricultural sectors in developing countries are characterized by small farm households with 
low agricultural productivity, incomes and levels of technology use. Engaging in export crops 
is one opportunity to increase farm household incomes and, thus, bear a growth potential for 
the agricultural sector Agriculture is of great importance in terms of livelihoods of the rural 
population because it accounts for 61% of employment and 14% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in developing countries (World Bank, 1999). Though not dominant in world markets, 
major agricultural exports from developing countries include fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV), 
oilseeds, coffee and cocoa. These markets are now threatened by Western European 
consumers’ concerns about health, environmental and working conditions which impose high 
challenges to value chains. FFV are particularly monitored and inspected at import entry 
points because they have high chances of microbiological contaminations from poor hygiene 
and pesticide residues from intensive use of agrochemicals (Jaffee, 2005). To solve food 
quality and safety coordination problem, Western governments use mandatory regulations 
while retailers and exporters introduce a range of private quality assurance standards (QAS). 
QAS are important for developing countries farms and firms because they determine access to 
specific segments of the market, to specific countries and the terms of participation in global 
value chains (Vorley and Fox, 2004). On the one hand, standards set barriers for new entrants 
in the value chain, and throw new challenges to existing developing country suppliers (Jaffee, 
2003). On the other hand, the challenge of rising standards provides the opportunity for 
selected suppliers to add value, assimilate new functions, improve their products, and even 
spur new or enhanced forms of cooperation among actors in a specific industry or country 
(Jaffee, 2003). The basis for the development of specifically farm based QAS to document 
and certify the production practices for farm-level systems cannot be overlooked. For 
instance, food scares e.g., poultry salmonella outbreak and Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United Kingdom (UK) and lately Entero-hemorrhagic 
Escherichia Coli (EHEC) and Schmallenberg virus in parts of the European Union (EU) 
continue to plague livestock and FFV sectors. This has regulatory implications because 
developing countries have comparative advantage over developed countries in the production 
of especially vegetables, cut flowers and fish (Jaffee, 2003). Further, Western governments 
regulations are in earnest to control food safety risks e.g., UK Food Safety Act (1990) on due 
diligence in the quality and safety of consumer products, the EU directive on pesticides 
residue limits (42/2000/EC), Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) monitoring program on 
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removal and approval of agro-chemical active substances for use in farming and traceability 
(178/2002/EC) requirement for food handlers (Commission of European Communities, 2004, 
2006). Developing countries depend heavily on use of fertilizers and chemicals to increase 
productivity and control pests and diseases which means that foreign regulations have an 
impact on production, and post-harvest quality. Private QAS are dominant among retailers 
with codes of practices, farm audits and testing of residues on exported products being used to 
differentiate product and production systems (Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). Additionally, 
retailers demand environmental care, worker-welfare and the origin of food products, showing 
that the participation of smallholders in international markets will depend on their ability to 
meet current and emerging demands especially QAS.  
Because many QAS contain detailed requirements concerning the production and marketing 
process of agricultural products, poor smallholders in developing countries, especially, might 
face potential market access barriers. These market changes increase pressure on farm 
production costs because approved pesticides are expensive, and there are administratively 
demanding farm audits and certification programs beside competition for supplies from big 
farms (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). The main debate however, is that QAS are excluding 
resource-poor producers in developing countries by setting higher standards for existing 
suppliers and raising entry requirements for new entrants. An epic case is the establishment of 
EUREPGAP
1
 (currently GlobalGAP (GGAP)) by Euro Retailers Produce Working Group as a 
farm based QAS to try to control farm level produce quality and safety (Van der Port, 2007). 
GGAP started as a voluntary QAS but has grown into a mandatory QAS for those wishing to 
export to most Western food retailers (Codron et al., 2005). It is currently the most widely 
used Business to Business (B2B) farm QAS in 108 countries covering crops (e.g., FFV, 
coffee), livestock (e.g., poultry, pigs) and aquaculture (e.g., finfish, molluscs). Most food 
retailers in the EU demand GGAP certification (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). The standard 
demands upfront farm investments and traceability for certification which constrain resource-
poor smallholders because of lack of financial and expertise capabilities. Kenya exports its 
FFV in the larger EU exposing over 70% of smallholders to GGAP certification. Certification 
requires producers to invest in a grading shed, washing points, protective garments, pesticide 
store and calibrated sprayer and implement a traceability system. Yet the extra cost burden on 
farm production is not followed by an observable price premium for compliance. Some 
producers for not being able to meet extra costs have switched into the alternative markets 
                                                 
1
 GlobalGAP is used for EUREPGAP to refer to studies that have been published or papers presented with the 
name EUREPGAP before the name switch. However, the materials are referenced in their originality. 
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that do not demand certification (Graffham et al., 2007). For instance, by 2010, only 318 
Kenyan producers had GGAP certification compared to 34 individual farms and 352 producer 
groups in 2006 (GGAP, 2010b). The strategy for alternative markets is to engage smallholders 
in closely monitored contract production or to buy in the open market. A contract has 
significant benefits to producers such as an assured buyer, reduced price risk, favourable 
credit terms where available and lower marketing costs. GGAP is therefore determining 
market entry and segmenting markets in favour of the most innovative at the farm level. Few 
empirical studies on GGAP adoption exist (e.g., Okello and Swinton, 2007, Asfaw et al., 
2010, Muriithi et al., 2010). This study provides more insight into the role of farm-level 
determinants in the successful adoption of GGAP. The study also investigates the presence of 
a price premium after compliance by empirically estimating a price function in the presence 
of GGAP using one-season cross-sectional price data. The study further analyzes choice of 
contractual forms: written or oral, and the frequency of renewal in the alternative fresh 
produce markets. The study uses French beans as a representative crop because it is widely 
farmed by smallholders with more than half of it being exported into the EU. A description of 
French beans marketing, studies on GGAP in Kenya and elsewhere, objectives of the study, 
source of data used to answer the three questions and the layout of the dissertation, follows.  
1.1 Kenya’s French beans: Domestic and international trade and challenges  
French bean is the most important export vegetable in Kenya. They are grown on small farm 
sizes (0.35-1.2ha) using family and limited hired labor in many regions
2
 that have fertile soils 
to support high value crops either through rain fed or irrigated farming. French beans are 
produced for processing purposes or for the fresh market. The beans have a higher income 
generation compared to traditional crops such as maize and require low level of fixed capital 
investments. There are about 2.57 million smallholders in agriculture with an estimated 
60,000 producing French beans on slightly above 10% of the 82,000 ha of land under 
vegetables (Ebony Consulting International, 2001). Smallholders contribute between 47-60% 
of the total export volumes of fresh fruit and vegetables (Jaffee, 2003; Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority (HCDA), 2004). The participation of smallholders in export markets 
is supported by linkage to the export exit point in Nairobi by tarmac or rural graveled roads, 
numerous private export firms, intermediaries and producer groups, established pre-cooling 
facilities and ready export market destinations (Minot and Ngigi, 2004). Exports are also 
promoted by preferential rate under Generalized System of Preferences (Jaffee and Masakure, 
                                                 
2
 The Horticultural Crops Development Authority identifies specific production areas in every province i.e., 
Central, Western, Eastern, North Eastern, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast and Nairobi. 
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2005). 
There is increased demand for fresh produce by Western food retailers from larger suppliers 
that can document production practices, ensure consistency and reliability (Barret et al., 1999; 
Dolan and Humphrey, 2004). However, independent producers, outgrower
3
 schemes and 
group producers are still preferred by exporters for outsourced contracted supplies because 
they can observe agronomic practices more carefully for field crops (Humphrey, 2005). 
Contracting specifies the inputs to be used and the rotation program for the contracted crops 
(Jaffee, 2003). Additionally, because beans can be exported to wholesale or supermarkets by 
small and medium or large exporters, smallholder outputs are used to serve short time orders 
or complement supplies. Small and medium firms export small consignments during the peak 
season in October-April while large firms export year-round using supplies from their own 
farms and monitored ‘satellite farms’ (Jaffee, 1995). Small and medium exporters control 
about 30% and large exporters 70% of the total volume of fresh fruit and vegetables exports 
from Kenya (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004). Figure 1.1 shows that most of the fresh French 
beans are exported. The main markets include the UK, France, Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: % share of Kenya’s French beans exports to total production by volume 
Source: Adapted from FAOSTAT, 2010 and EUROSTAT, 2010 
 
The share declines between 1995 and 1998 but increases steadily from 1999. This decline 
occurs during the 1998 El Nino rains. The decline during 2007/2009 is partly due to 
                                                 
3
 An outgrower is a farmer or group of farmers sponsored by an export firm to produce a certain crop on own 
farms, provided with high yielding variety seeds, pesticides and credit etc and monitored by field officers. 
Exchange relationships are governed by an enforceable supply contract on paper. 
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disruption by post-election violence and volcanic eruptions in Europe (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2009).  
Common to most export crops, French beans producers face numerous challenges. First, 
domestic consumption is low estimated at 6.6% of the total weight of the food items in the 
upper income consumers and 11.9% for the middle income consumers while the local market 
is not well developed among upcoming supermarkets and traditional markets like municipal 
markets (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Second, post-
harvest crop losses because of poor transport, lack of proper refrigeration facilities and 
emergence of pests marginalizes the majority of smallholders (Kimenye, 1995; Natural 
Resources Institute, 2003). Third, high competition in terms of price and quality, high 
airfreight and shipment costs, seasonality of exports, intensive production and surveillance for 
safety in international markets reduces exporters margins (Jaffee, 2003). Nevertheless, Kenya 
remains the EU retailers choice supply source for beans in sub-Saharan Africa and therefore 
faces the challenge of meeting quality and safety requirements. For instance in the first six 
months of 2002, five consignments of French beans were rejected at UK and Dutch borders in 
relation to the emergence of caterpillar (Jaffee, 2003). The principal challenge however, is 
how smallholders can comply with GGAP standard which is subscribed to by many food 
retailers in the EU where over 60% of Kenya’s exports of fruit and vegetables are marketed. 
Further, questions of a price premium to cover GGAP compliance costs remain unanswered. 
Additionally, both buyers of GGAP and non-GGAP certified produce continue to procure 
smallholders’ supplies using informal or closely monitored production contracts.  
1.2 GlobalGAP standard: certification and empirical studies 
GGAP standard was established in 1997 as a private initiative of Euro Retailers
4
 Produce 
Working Group to address traceability, hygienic production and handling of products farmed 
by suppliers to assure consumers of their safety (GGAP, 2010a). The standard has rapidly 
spread into many countries and many food retailers in Western Europe require their suppliers 
to be GGAP certified (Jaffee, 2005; Codron et al., 2005). The process of certification
5
 
involves 1) pre-assessment and documentation review of a producer’s facilities and 
production operations, 2) field audits, 3) verification of conformity and 4) certification. 
Smallholders are required to invest in a grading shed, watering points, sorting tables, toilets, 
calibrated sprayers, pesticides store, and a waste disposal pit for pesticide effluents (Okello 
                                                 
4
 E.g., REWE Group (Germany), Ahold (Netherlands), ASDA Group Plc. (UK), Delhaize (Belgium) etc. A 
complete list is available at http://www2.globalgap.org/members.html?memtype=retail  
5
 Process control points can be found at www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idart=1440  
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and Swinton, 2007). The standard requires use for farming only approved pesticides which are 
often times costly and establishment of a traceability system (Grijp et al., 2005; Moll and 
Igual, 2005). Costs of soil and water testing, certifier’s fee, farm audit and certificate fees are 
paid by producers (Chia-Hui Lee, 2006; Graffham et al., 2007). This has the potential to 
exclude smallholders in developing countries because they have low managerial, financial and 
innovative capabilities and export market access is limited to few linkages through few export 
firms or large cooperatives. Kenyan smallholders are co-opted in the quality and safety value 
chains by exporters through contracted production. Currently, only 318 producers are certified 
compared with 34 individual farmers and 352 groups, in 2006. Worldwide the number of 
certified individual and producer marketing organizations has grown from 18,000 in 2004 to 
102,267 as of April 2010 (Moeller, 2006; GGAP, 2010b). If adopted GGAP has the potential 
to spread benefits of food quality and safety to local markets, improve the health and welfare 
of producers, protect the environment from hazardous materials and enhance smallholders’ 
market access opportunities (Boselie and Van de Kop, 2004; Humphrey, 2005; Graffham et 
al., 2007). Empirical studies on compliance with GGAP for Kenyan smallholders are scarce. 
However, there are funded reports (Graffham et al., 2007; Thiagarajan et al., 2005; Waweru, 
2006), commentaries and assessments of GGAP as a quality standard (e.g., Jaffee, 2003; 
Nyambo and Nyaga, 2006; Moeller, 2006; Liaison Committee on Europe Africa Caribbean 
and Pacific (COLEACP), 2006) and lately empirical studies by Asfaw et al., (2010) and 
Muriithi et al., (2010). Elsewhere empirical studies on GGAP include Kleinwechter and 
Grethe, (2006), Chemnitz, (2007) and Souza Monteiro and Caswell, (2009). The empirical 
studies address adoption or compliance on the basis of producer, buyer and market factors but 
do not consider the role of competition, type of the supply chain and the length of producer-
buyer relationship in the adoption of GGAP. Further, the studies do not estimate the effect of 
GGAP on farm gate producer prices, which might determine the sustainability of the standard. 
Finally, Okello and Swinton (2007) have estimated participation in contract production.    
1.2. Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are: 
a) To determine the farm-level determinants of successful GlobalGAP adoption among 
smallholders. 
b) To determine the effect of GlobalGAP certification on farm gate producer prices. 
c) To analyze choice of contracts and the frequency of renewal among smallholders. 
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1.3. Study area and data sources 
1.3.1 Study area 
This study was done in Mwea Tebere in Kirinyaga South District of Central Province Kenya.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Mwea Tebere showing some of the French beans growing areas  
It is situated 120 km North West of Nairobi with a population of 153, 095 and an estimated 
5400 rice producers’ farm families settled over 36 villages6 (Government of Kenya, 2009). 
French beans have a long history in the region. It is grown under irrigation from streams, 
rivers and National Irrigation Board (NIB) water canals by use of a water pump or free flow 
(Obare and Kariuki, 2003). Agricultural soils are either red alluvial or dark black cotton 
(Nguyo et al., 2002). French beans farms are limited in size due to tenancy agreement
7
 
between Mwea Irrigation Settlement Scheme (MISS) and NIB (Swynnerton, 1957). Farming 
depends on family and hired labor. The study site has horticultural pre-cooling facilities at 
                                                 
6
 A village is a collection of several farm families usually under a village ‘headman’-administrator, in 
government parlance. Several villages within a common boundary and proximity to key towns make up a 
location.   
7
 A tenant under NIB contract is entitled to 0.41 ha of land for the cultivation of maize or traditional beans and a 
further 1.62 ha earmarked for rice cultivation. The government of Kenya is currently in the process of issuing 
title deeds to rice tenants. 
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Kimbimbi and is the hub of horticultural farming in central Kenya (Fresh Produce Exporters 
Association of Kenya, 2006). 
1.3.2 Survey administration and data collection 
The survey data was collected between April-June 2006, with identification and selection of 
respondents through the services of village headmen done in April 2006. The sampling unit 
was an individual smallholder at the village level. Because of unequal distribution of villages, 
the region was divided into major horticulture growing sub-locations: Murinduko, Tebere, 
Nyangati, Thiba, Mwea and Mutithi, based on the demarcation of those regions along Rivers 
Nyamindi, Thiba, Murubara, Project Murubara and Mwea Canal. For each region, a random 
sample of four villages has been selected. In each village, smallholders have been selected 
based on whether one would be harvesting a French bean crop during the month of June 2006. 
A total of 249 smallholders in 24 villages were surveyed and monitored until harvesting. Price 
data
8
 involved on-farm visits during the harvesting and collection of beans at the grading and 
sorting sheds. This procedure allowed enumerators to observe crop handling activities e.g. 
sorting, washing, grading and packaging etc and transactions related to change of crop title 
e.g. issue of receipts and trace-back identities etc. This was done on Mondays and 
Wednesdays for a period of 3 full weeks in June, yielding six price waves. Data on 
smallholders’ socio-economic factors, infrastructure and marketing aspects, was collected on 
other days of the week. This included GGAP certification status, prices for each grade, access 
to bank account, extension, type of supply contract with buyer, number of contract seasons 
with buyer, training on pesticides, crop and personal hygiene, post-harvest crop handling care, 
and record keeping. Other data involved farm assets, production structure, number of 
collective institutions in the village, number of French beans farmers in the village, number of 
French beans farmers sharing a buyer, and number of buyers in the village.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The dissertation is organized in three essays. The first essay (Chapter two) estimates the 
factors that are likely to influence the successful adoption of GGAP by smallholders. As a 
farm gate standard there are implications for smallholders’ production and market access 
opportunities. Due to emphasis on producer group certification, individual smallholders may 
have no chance for certification unless they have large farm sizes, which is not realistic. This 
                                                 
8
 Mwea has had running research projects which makes it easier to get trained research data collectors. However, 
it makes it difficult to obtain information from farmers who complain of too many questionnaires from the 
numerous projects. Thus, in order to elicit price information during harvesting and subsequent follow up for un-
clarified non-price related data, each respondent was given a mobile top-up card worth 2.5€ (1€=KE94). 
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essay argues that smallholders can still produce beans that match up to GGAP standards for 
the alternative markets if they have non-land assets, invest in farmer capacity and have access 
to non-financial incentives. A probit model is utilized with adoption of GGAP as the 
dependent variable to derive economic estimates.  
The second essay (Chapter three) investigates whether GGAP certified producers really get a 
price premium. There has been a lot of debate on lack of an observable price premium for 
those complying with food retailers’ sponsored certification standards. Whether this is a 
business strategy to block competition in B2B chains, the question is what smallholders 
would gain to remain in production. A price premium is therefore argued to be a rational 
consequence for a standard that imposes compliance costs to producers. The observed 
producer prices during the market day exhibit some form of auction behavior where, apart 
from quality other factors such as the transaction costs facing a buyer come into play. This 
generates auction prices for a buyer per producer per region per day. Therefore, using a 
hedonic price function estimates for GGAP certification and other variables are obtained.  
The third essay (Chapter four) looks at how smallholders choose between written and oral 
contracts in the production and marketing of export beans. Contracts are used as a strategy to 
mitigate farm level quality and safety risks in smallholdings. Because of the nature of fresh 
markets, the type of horticulture exporters and quality motivations, farm level contracts 
exhibit different formats. Faced with a choice rational producers will choose an option that 
leaves them no worse off  or that which yields the highest benefit compared with all the other 
alternatives. The choice has risk-sharing and transaction costs reduction considerations for 
producers and buyers. This notion is used to model choice of contracts using a probit to 
estimate inferential coefficients. The essay also estimates the factors determining the 
frequency of contract renewals. Producers and buyers will renew contracts based on some 
satisfaction, trust, level of switching costs and competition in the market. The frequency of 
contract renewals is modeled and analyzed using negative binomial regression to capture the 
lower bound zero renewals and inequality of the conditional means and variances. 
In Chapter five the conclusions for the three essays, policy implications and recommendations 
for further research are presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The role of non-land assets, farmer capacity and incentives in successful adoption of 
GlobalGAP certification: Lessons from Kenya’s smallholders perspective 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Private food quality and safety standards are gaining importance in international trade as 
checks on food safety risks. But there are possibilities of excluding smallholders in 
developing countries because of the requirement for investment in infrastructure and 
traceability to obtain certification. We empirically explain smallholders’ successful adoption 
of GlobalGAP standard in Kenya’s French beans marketing. The results show that successful 
adoption is highly probable with more contract renewals with a buyer and the number of 
producers sharing a buyer. Other success factors include a larger area under beans, higher 
number of producer groups in neighborhood, larger producer groups, ownership of protective 
garments, more extension visits and experience. Conversely, an already closely monitored 
short supply chain, more producers in a village and a higher producer price potentially reduce 
successful certification. The results suggest that market partnerships, investment in farmer 
capacity and farm assets, and targeted non-monetary incentives are important success 
determinants in the adoption of supply chain standards for premium markets. On the other 
hand, closely monitored short supply chains, independent production and higher producer 
prices do not favor adoption of private farm level quality and safety standards.   
 
Keywords: Non-land assets; Capacity; Incentive; GlobalGAP certification; Smallholders, 
Developing countries; Kenya  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The export of fresh fruits and vegetables is currently the second highest foreign exchange 
earner contributing 23% of the total agricultural Gross Domestic Product in Kenya. Estimates 
show that up to 80% of horticultural production in Kenya is undertaken by smallholders 
(Horticultural Crops Development Authority, 2007). However, public regulations from 
Western countries,’- notably use of pesticides in farming and traceability of farm produce 
favor a reorganization of production and marketing of horticultural products from developing 
and least developed countries (Unnevehr, 2000). Further, a shift of food quality and safety 
responsibility to suppliers in the chain through third party monitored voluntary codes of 
conduct in form of pre-farm gate certifications by importing supermarkets and retailers is 
putting pressure on smallholders (Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). Use of these quality assurance 
standards (QAS) as markets access and product differentiation tools compounds horticultural 
markets more. One of the private food quality standards that producers of fresh fruits and 
vegetables have to comply with to remain in export crops production is Global Good 
Agricultural Practices (GGAP, formally EUREPGAP). Smallholders can obtain GGAP 
certification either individually or as a producer group. Primarily, GGAP certification 
involves taking full account of pesticides use and disposal because of health, occupational and 
environmental concerns, investments in supporting farm assets, and a certification fee. 
Additionally, they must show compliance with traceability of produce, establish sorting and 
grading facilities and a record keeping procedure. 
Case studies show that GGAP technical requirements, investment and certification costs are 
enormous (Belleti et al., 2005; Graffham et al., 2007). Smallholders are disadvantaged by 
GGAP because they have limited access to financial, technical and infrastructural resources. 
Further, many supply chain members in the European Union (EU) where 60% of Kenya’s 
fruits and vegetables are marketed are GGAP compliant. Therefore, failure to comply might 
mean mass disenfranchising of smallholders, loss of international markets and foreign 
exchange earnings. With increased emphasis on compliance even from local horticultural 
associations and donor funded programs, there is need to understand the repositioning of 
smallholders in the market chain. Currently, there is not enough evidence of what affects 
smallholders’ successful adoption of GGAP in fruits and vegetables production in Kenya. 
This study empirically estimates the factors that influence smallholders’ success to adopt 
GGAP. The underlying data stem from a survey of French beans producers in Kenya.  
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1, has an overview of incentive 
and motivation for adopting QAS followed by the theoretical model and research hypotheses 
in Section 2. The empirical specification, methodology and data description are presented in 
Section 3. The results of the empirical estimation are reported and discussed in Section 4 and 
summary and conclusions in Section 5.   
1.1. Overview of incentives and adoption of Quality assurance standards 
Firm based Quality Assurance Standards 
Firm based quality assurance standards document and certify quality management systems for 
a company’s internal operations. Quality assurance standards will influence costs, prices and 
profits of firms but this depends on a firm’s characteristics and activities (Holleran et al., 
1999; Henson and Holt, 2000). Further, specific impacts differ from one firm to another. 
There are expectations that after adoption of a QAS firms will get tangible or intangible 
benefits. Fouayzi et al., (2006) identify product traceability, product quality, and ability to 
maintain current customers and attract new ones. Some empirical studies find that confidence 
with certification agents motivates satisfaction, (Schulze et al., 2007), others recognize 
perceived benefits such as improved reputation, product safety, business processes and 
transparency (Gawron and Theuvsen, 2006). Other benefits of a QAS include satisfaction 
with sales, and access to the domestic market, and with market share (Fouayzi et al., 2006).  
There is consensus in most studies that adoption of QAS is related to a firm’s characteristics 
mainly because size determines access to resources. Zuhair et al., (2006) found that firm size, 
country of control and firm’s level of innovation were more influential than industry, major 
market served and the level of inspection on the adoption intensity of food safety and quality 
practice. Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson (2006) also find large firm size, use of other’s 
brand name, sales and reputation as key motivators of responsiveness to food safety. Adoption 
is also more likely with firms with a higher number of employees, country of ownership and 
control, level of innovativeness, level of export orientation and the subsector the firm operates 
in (Herath et al., 2007). In addition, trading with firms that participate in a given QAS, a 
firm’s own ability to undertake a successful implementation, customers’ pressure and need to 
maintain competitiveness in the marketplace are key incentives for small firms to adopt QAS 
(Karipidis et al., 2009). Jin and Zhou (2011) find that cooperative size, destination market, 
reputation, perception and attitude about standards and expected costs and benefits affect the 
decision to adopt standards.  
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Barriers to the adoption of firm based QAS are numerous. Lack of a professional quality 
manager and qualified managers to implement QAS, resistance from executives and workers 
and lack of understanding of QAS documentation are key disincentives to adoption (Karipidis 
et al., 2009). Government regulations, walk-in customers and operations in the international 
market also reduce responsiveness to food safety (Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson, 2006). 
Gawron and Theuvsen (2006) find incomprehensible International Food Standard (IFS) 
requirements and low managerial practicability as prime disadvantages and Lo and 
Humphreys, (2000) and Poksinska et al., (2006) find adoption among small firms problematic 
due to limited resources, and lack of suitable training or educational programs. Schulze et al., 
(2007) argue that perception of the usefulness of certification reduces with a farmer’s 
experience.  
Farmer based Quality Assurance Standards 
Farm based quality assurance standards document and certify the production practices for 
farm-level systems. The motivation for farmer based QAS varies but price expectations and 
market access are primary concerns for producers (Hobbs, 2003). Firms introduce farm gate 
standards to control food quality and safety, control supply of produce in the chain and for 
competitiveness (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). The adoption of QAS among producers is 
influenced by public extension, membership to a producer group, a supply contract, large 
farm size holding and wealth (Okello, 2005). Access to QAS information and vertical 
integration via exporters, membership to a producer organization, media access, revenue, 
producer’s age, contract farming and farm size positively influence adoption (Kleinwechter 
and Grethe, 2006). Graffham et al., (2007) find that membership to a producer group and 
linkage to an exporter or donor influence adoption of QAS. Asfaw et al., (2010) find adoption 
positively correlated to households with a higher number of female members, intra-household 
literacy levels, producer group membership, access to information and the level of agricultural 
training prior to adoption. The level of organization of farmers is more critical to participation 
in QAS than farm size (Chemnitz, 2007). Membership in larger producer organizations, 
higher farm productivity, production under a protected designation of origin (PDO), and full 
time farmers motivate growers to adopt QAS (Souza Monteiro and Caswell, 2009). Muriithi 
et al., (2010) found extension services, farm size, and household size to have significant 
positive influence on compliance. Graffham et al., (2007), conclude that adoption of QAS is 
also limited by financial viability and lack of a price incentive. Muriithi et al., (2010) also find 
expectation of a premium price positive but with insignificant effect. The costs of compliance 
are critical impediments to adoption (Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006). 
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Generally, firms and farmers are motivated by internal and external incentives in their 
decisions to adopt QAS. There is motivation arising from the perceived or expected benefits 
such as profits, premium prices, reputation, reduced costs of operations and market 
positioning. The motivation to adopt may be due to pressure from downstream trade partners, 
customers and regulation from governments. Firm size, markets served, inter-linkage with 
firms that have adopted a QAS, financial capability and human resource capacity motivate 
adoption of QAS. The main disincentives to adoption are costs of compliance, lack of a 
definite premium, complex QAS documentation and lack of professional workers. Producers 
will adopt QAS based on expected producer price, schooling, standard’s information, 
extension services and membership to a producer group, farm size, farm productivity and 
wealth, access to market linkages, experience, and age. The principal hindrance to adoption is 
lack of financial viability of the QAS in question. Most of the studies are qualitative targeting 
firm based QAS such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards series 
e.g., 9000, Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP), and Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP). There is a paucity of empirical studies on farmer based QAS especially in 
developing countries.  
2 A THEORETICAL MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
2.1 A model of willingness to adopt GGAP 
In this study, GGAP adoption is considered an organizational innovation because it is more 
than the adoption of high value yielding seeds or irrigation technology etc. Theoretically, a 
producer is faced with alternative innovations that either satisfies or satisfies not his 
maximization problem, which could be higher profits, personal health, reputation or higher 
stability of sales.  For simplicity, let a producer be assumed to maximize expected profits, 
when choosing to adopt an organizational innovation like GGAP. Each innovation has a 
vector of attributes. However, the producer faces adoption constraints such as investment 
capital. The choice made is probabilistic because there are risks associated with each 
production innovation, which renders a producer to a finite set of alternatives from the choice 
set. A producer evaluates each innovation on the basis of attributes and constraints, assigns a 
level of profit to each and finally chooses a preferred method. A producer cannot choose two 
innovations at the same time, hence the choice is also binary (Greene, 2000). Assuming 
rationality in the decision making process, an innovation is adopted if the expected profits 
from that innovation are greater than all the other alternatives. For a producer to prefer one 
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innovation for the other, it is assumed that choice decisions are made under full information. 
Further, the profits derived are only known to the producer.  
Because profits from other production innovations are not easily known, a researcher depends 
on the observable portions of the maximization problem to determine choice. In our case, 
what is observed is the choice made by the decision maker at the time of the survey i.e., 
GGAP certified or not, and the socio-economic factors (e.g., farm structure), which generate 
heterogeneity of adoption across a given population of producers. The decision to choose an 
innovation can be represented in a behavioral model as follows: 
    jijCjPCiP nnjnin  ;,...,1|   
where, i is the chosen innovation, j , is the vector of all the other alternative choices, nC is the 
choice set of innovations available to producer n , and  is the expected profit of each 
alternative. This means that a decision maker n  chooses an alternative i  from a finite set of 
alternatives in choice set nC with probability  iP  if the profit associated with i  is greater 
than the probabilities associated with all other alternatives in the choice set. 
Studies of the adoption of agricultural technologies have focused on the dichotomous decision 
to participate by estimating limited dependent variable models (Feder and Umali, 1993). In 
firm and farmer based QAS, empirical studies have used dichotomous models to estimate 
one-time adoption. Okello, (2005), Wollni and Zeller, (2007), Asfaw et al., (2010) and 
Muriithi et al., (2010) use the probit model, for instance. Others have used the logistic model 
(Zuhair et al., 2006; Herath et al., 2007; Souza Monteiro and Caswell, 2009; Jin and Zhou, 
2011). Other models such as the hazard model used in Carletto et al., (2010), capture data that 
have structural and time varying characteristics. Others, e.g., the Tobit model, aim to capture 
the simultaneity of decisions such as choice and intensity of use (Brush et al., 1992). The 
success to adopt GGAP certification might be taken as a dichotomous adoption decision 
because a producer or producer group goes through an audit and verification process to 
confirm conformity with control points and compliance levels before a certificate is issued. 
This is a one-time decision and is fully adopted. We have classified producers into those 
certified or not certified. This is plausible, because there is no envisaged analysis of the 
intensity of utilizing GGAP after adoption which overrules simultaneity of adoption and use 
decisions. The adoption variable is expressed in binary form, 1 if the producer has adopted, 0, 
otherwise. 
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Factors affecting successful adoption of GlobalGAP 
Farmer characteristics 
Studies on adoption of QAS reveal that there exists a relationship between observed adoption 
and a decision maker’s socio-economic characteristics. Education, experience, and farm sizes 
have been shown to positively influence the uptake of EUREPGAP and IFS by smallholders 
(Okello, 2005; Asfaw et al., 2010). Further evidence on socio-economic factors in the 
adoption of new farming methods is found in Brush et al., (1992). Farmers who have more 
school years have the ability to perceive and conceptualize an innovation like GGAP and  
critically evaluate whether to adopt or not based on costs and expected benefits. The flow and 
interpretation of technical information, which in turn reduces costs of training is easier with 
schooled producers. Additionally, educated smallholders may want to trade in export 
horticulture by adopting GGAP certification as a farm gate differentiation strategy from 
mainstream producers. Lack of education translates into poor understanding of tough quality 
and safety standards and low engagement of small farmers in supermarket supply contracts in 
developing countries (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003).  
Experience in horticulture farming is a competitive attribute imparting a producer with 
production and market skills due to the learning process and exposure to agronomic and 
marketing changes within the sector. As stock of knowledge gained over the production and 
marketing cycles, experienced producers can form informed choices. If age is considered a 
proxy for risk taking behaviour e.g., Carletto et al., (2010), then young vibrant producers may 
be willing to take on GGAP standard with its demands for training and observation of quality 
and safety than older producers. They are most likely to use credit to run farming as a 
business than older producers who may be pre-occupied with stable incomes. However, 
because the ability to take financial and managerial risks demanded by certification may 
decrease beyond a certain threshold age, quadratic age is used to capture decline in risk taking 
behavior and hypothesized to be negative.  
Apart from the above socio-economic factors, we introduce the number of seasons a producer 
was involved with a buyer in the export of French beans to represent specialization and 
specific knowledge on beans production, markets and future changes. Contrary to experience, 
which endows a producer with general knowledge, interaction with an exporter for more 
seasons will more likely influence a producer to accept market changes with a view to 
remaining in business.  
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Hypothesis 1: A producer’s age, schooling, horticulture faming experience and the number of 
contract seasons with an exporter will be positively correlated with GGAP certification. 
Farm characteristics  
It has also been shown that where adoption of food safety schemes is costly, farm or firm size 
reduces the difficult due to scale economies (Graffham et al., 2007; Herath et al., 2007). 
Producers with large farms are able to implement productivist practices such as traceability, 
investment in farm equipment at low per unit costs and assemble crops more efficiently. If 
farm size were to proxy wealth (see Asfaw et al., 2010), large farm sizes would mean more 
wealth base and vice versa. It is therefore more likely for producers with large farm sizes to 
adopt certification than producers farming small farm sizes. 
The initial investments before a certificate is offered for a QAS are in most cases enormous 
and may hinder adoption by a producer. In global trade, there is pressure for extreme care on 
food handling at the farm level and at all points of the food chain aimed at reducing health 
risks from pesticide residues and microbial contaminants (World Health Organization, 1998; 
Zepp et al., 1998; Kilmer et al., 2001; Hobbs, 2003). To be GGAP certified, a pre-assessment 
and documentation of a producer’s facilities and production operations must show 
compliance. Essential upfront investments include a pesticides store, calibrated sprayer, 
protective clothing, waste disposal site, toilet and a grading shed (GGAP, 2010; Graffham et 
al., 2007). A grading shed may be an individual on-farm or common structure. A common 
shed serves proximately located producers during sorting, washing and packing of beans. A 
grading shed presents considerable likelihood of reducing post farm produce contaminations. 
For crop and personal hygiene, producers or their farm workers require protective garments 
when applying pesticides. Pesticides are applied using a regularly calibrated knapsack sprayer 
to reduce instances of overdosing crops and spillages that can contaminate the soil and the 
environment. Protective garments deter chemicals from affecting an applicator’s skin and 
inhalation of toxic fumes during application. Okello and Swinton (2010) find use of protective 
gear to reduce ailments and exposure to pesticide hazards.  
Farm investments are primary in re-auditing for re-certification purposes. Assets are expected 
to promote adoption because they are essential part of the certification process. Besides, assets 
reduce a producer’s degree of pesticides residue levels and microbiological contaminations in 
the final product. In the analysis, we include protective garments to represent farm assets 
since a grade shed and sprayer show perfect prediction of GGAP standard. Meeting maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) on farm produce meant for export to Western European markets is 
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important meaning that farm gate producers have to make proper use and application of crop 
protection products, observe pre-harvest spraying interval and document spraying regimes. 
Apart from MRLs, producers’ welfare and environmental care are key components of GGAP. 
Therefore, ownership of protective garments is expected to positively affect successful 
adoption of GGAP certification.  
Hypothesis 2: Smallholders that have a large farm size, an on-farm grading shed, a calibrated 
sprayer and protective garments have a higher probability of being certified. 
Market and marketing characteristics 
Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) and Karipidis et al., (2009) found market participants such as 
buyers of produce to be motivators of food quality practices. The target export markets for 
fruits and vegetables from Kenya are mainly UK and the larger EU region and are dominated 
by wholesalers and retailers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Compared to retailers, wholesalers 
are not as strict on GGAP certification requirements because they target less differentiated 
consumer markets (Jaffee, 2003). Because downstream chain members define the observed 
production and procurement relationship with upstream chain members there may be selection 
of producers (Henson et al., 2005). Exporters that serve markets that demand certification will 
require and probably support certification of their smallholder suppliers in a cost-sharing 
arrangement similar to ones identified in Graffham et al., (2007) and Ashraf et al., (2009). In 
these arrangements registration, farm audits and certification fees are paid by either the 
exporter, donor/sponsor or jointly with smallholders to guarantee commitment of producers. 
Intermediaries are mainly considered an impediment to certification (Waweru, 2006). Our 
dataset contains export firms and intermediaries but no demarcation of the export destinations. 
However, export firms can buy directly or through trusted intermediaries. For instance, one 
certified group sells through an intermediary and two non certified groups sell directly to an 
export firm. We have classified marketers as direct or indirect buyers and christened them 
short and long supply chain respectively. A short supply chain allows immediate contact 
between buyers and suppliers so information sharing is more efficient than in a long supply 
chain. It is hypothesized that successful adoption of certification will be more likely with a 
short than a long supply chain.  
Controlling quality within the supply chain depends on preferred supplier relationships (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Boselie et al., 2003; Narrod et al., 2009). Farm gate relationships may 
have a positive or negative effect on the adoption of GGAP in two ways: if a buyer considers 
certification necessary or if a buyer is contented with product quality and safety from 
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contracted smallholders to serve alternative less discerning markets (Jaffee, 2003). However, 
where the relationship involves closely monitored provision of inputs and direct sourcing 
from producers, certification will be more likely. A close relationship offers possibility of 
joint participation in negotiating and sharing costs pertaining to new market changes. The 
intensity of the relationship is included in the model through interaction variables between 
supply chain and type of supply contract.   
Hypothesis 3: A short supply chain is more likely to be associated with GGAP certification 
than a long supply chain. A short supply chain with a closely monitored supply contract will 
have a higher probability of being certified if exporters find it necessary to do so, otherwise 
not.  
Collective organizations 
Okello and Swinton, (2007), Souza Monteiro and Caswell, (2009) and Jin and Zhou (2011) 
have found producer organizations as critical in the adoption of QAS. The unit costs of 
compliance before certification are enormous for individual smallholders (Graffham et al., 
2007). Poor access to credit, information asymmetry, poor infrastructural developments and 
risk-averse behaviour aggravates smallholders’ marginalization (Byerlee and de Polanco, 
1986). Smallholders are principally certified as a producer group because of cost 
considerations (Thiagarajan et al., 2005; Graffham et al., 2007). In an organized group, 
smallholders can collectively access low cost credit, minimize monitoring and follow up costs 
through control and self-monitoring mechanism (De Souza Filho et al., 1993; Narrod et al., 
2009). GGAP defines a producer group as organized producers with their respective 
production locations that can allow establishment of a common quality management system 
and internal annual inspections across the whole group through random sampling of sites. The 
registered members of a producer group are legally responsible for their respective production 
locations.  
As social networks, producer organizations have the ability to strengthen cooperation through 
the values and norms that individuals share in common. These values and norms may include 
trust, reciprocity and sanctions (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000). Group production facilitates 
vertical cooperation with downstream marketers on choice of product specifications and 
quality levels, improved product credibility and timely delivery of orders, and reduced costs 
of product assembly and segregation. Due to perfect prediction of GGAP certification by 
group membership variable, we use the number of groups in a given village, group size and 
number of farmers using a common buyer, and the number of producers farming French beans 
24 
 
in a given village. In fact, group size and the number of groups in a village is critical due to 
economic viability of GGAP standard because if groups are too small and too dispersed, 
management and transaction costs increase. Fafchamps and Minten, (2001) find network of 
business contacts key ingredients in the performance of agricultural traders. It is expected 
these social networks will influence smallholders’ choice behaviour through collective human 
and financial support, commonality of production and marketing circumstances and set 
sanctions. 
Hypothesis 4: Social networks will increase the probability of smallholders being certified.  
Incentives 
Lack of training or technical knowhow is identified as a disincentive in the adoption of QAS 
(Poksinska et al., 2006; Muriithi et al., 2010). Demand for technical and administrative 
training on the part of producers is directed at minimization of product quality and safety 
information asymmetries (Henson et al., 2005; Vandergeest, 2007). Under GGAP 
certification, training is vital because of quality management system technicalities, use and 
application of crop protection products, understanding residue limits and sources of 
microbiological contaminations, management of producer groups and record keeping 
purposes. Training on standards, certification process and MRLs is provided either by 
government or private extension officers or jointly. The form of training obtained by 
smallholders will enhance their competencies in on- and off-farm crop handling practices and 
facilitate GGAP certification.  
Credit provision is identified as a strategy to mitigate idiosyncratic market failure in financing 
agricultural innovations (Rauriyar and Goode, 1996). Credit can be used to finance farm 
investments and working capital such as paying hired labor and offsetting harvesting costs. It 
is expected that producers with access to credit will be likely to adopt GGAP. Currently 
commercial banks in Kenya have smallholder tailored credit facilities for bank account 
holders. In our analysis we have used ownership of a bank account as a proxy for possibility 
of accessing credit.  
Holleran et al., (1999) and Hobbs (2003) argue that price and profit incentives motivate 
adopters of quality standards. This is important for smallholders who complain of lack of a 
price differential for adopting food quality and safety schemes (Graffham et al., 2007). A 
higher price expectation may spur demand for certification among smallholders if the price 
covers the costs of complying with the requirements because smallholders would not want to 
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be left worse off after certification. A higher price for certified produce may however be 
countered if alternative markets offered competitive prices without certification requirements. 
Hypothesis 5: Access to extension services, credit and the expectation of a higher price above 
competition increases the likelihood of GGAP certification.   
3 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF GLOBALGAP ADOPTION 
A binary model permits analysis of adoption by estimating a model relating the observed 
certification or non certification with factors likely to influence choice. Following the 
theoretical prepositions above, a producer is willing to adopt GGAP if the expected benefits 
of certification are strictly greater than the benefit of non-certification:  
 
Smallholders will adopt GGAP if its corresponding benefit is strictly larger than the 
benefit of the alternative method . The observed choice represents a binary variable 
which leads to two alternative econometric approaches. The model can be estimated by 
assuming a logistic or normal distribution density functions. In this case the distribution of 
choice of GGAP is unknown a priori because of the heterogeneity of smallholders’ choices. 
Therefore, we have assumed the idiosyncratic error terms in the estimated model to be 
independent normal variables and estimate a probit model. The decision is influenced in turn 
by socio-economic and other factors. These determinants are operationalized by explanatory 
variables explaining a producer’s choice. Consequently, the probability of a given smallholder 
choosing to adopt GGAP can be represented thus (Greene, 2000) 
 
where is the regression coefficient for the explanatory variable and are the 
explanatory factors facing smallholder . An error term captures omitted variables or 
researcher’s misconceptions. Using the maximum likelihood method, a vector of
coefficients that maximize the probability of observing a given sample is estimated. The 
coefficients are interpreted in terms of the relationship between the explanatory variables and 
the probability of GGAP certification by a smallholder. Positive coefficients show higher 
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probability of the successful adoption of GGAP standard and negative coefficients indicate 
lower probability.  
3.1 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses developed above, we specify the model for the adoption of GGAP 
among smallholders in the following form:  
  RDICOMMFAFFGGAP 6543210  
where,  
GGAP , is a binary variable: GGAP certified=1, 0, otherwise 
FF , are farm-farmer characteristics: age, schooling, horticulture farming experience, contract 
seasons and area under French beans. 
FA , are farm assets: ownership of protective garments 
MM , are market/marketing characteristics: type of market linkage, type of supply contract 
CO , are collective organizations: producer group membership, number of groups in village, 
group size, number of beans farmers in village and number of sellers with shared buyer. 
I , are monetary/non-monetary incentives: producer price, extension visits, credit access 
RD , is the control variable for regional differences: Upper Mwea region=1, 0, otherwise 
 , is the error term capturing measurement errors, proxy variables and unobserved attributes 
This dichotomous model is parameterized by including a random error term, which enables an 
analyst to take account of uncertainty from measurement errors, proxy variables and 
unobserved attributes. The error term can be assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
resulting in a probit model, or a logistic cumulative distribution, yielding the logit model 
(Maddala, 1999). The models arising are considered parsimonious and tractable in structure if 
it is assumed that a producer maximizes profits, has deterministic choice sets, producer 
characteristics are measurable and the error term has a simple structure. The estimates 
obtained from the model represent the probabilities of individuals selecting each alternative. 
3.2 Description of data 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis of factors 
influencing successful adoption of GGAP standard by French beans producers in Kenya. The 
data comes from a random sample of smallholders collected in April-June 2006. The sample 
is comprised of 249 smallholder farms producing French beans in Mwea Tebere of Kirinyaga 
district central Kenya from the following locations: Tebere, Nyangati, Murinduko, and Mwea. 
Our sample has 72 certified producers in 4 groups, and 177 non certified producers (28 in 2 
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groups and 149 independent producers). As outlined in the conceptual model, GGAP 
certification is a one-time adoption innovation with no intermediate adoption.  
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables by GGAP certification status 
 GGAP,N=72 Non-GGAP,N=177  
Independent Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t 
Farmer characteristics      
Farmer age (yrs) 43.29 7.02 40.86 9.62 -1.94 
Schooling (yrs) 10.97 2.14 9.91 2.26 -3.41 
Horticulture farming experience (yrs) 13.57 6.96 12.84 7.24 -.73 
Seasons with buyer (count) 8.2 3.9 3.19 3.75 -9.42 
Farm characteristics      
Area under beans (acres) 1.53 .77 .79 .54 -8.54 
Owns grading shed (0,1) 1 0 .26 .44 -2.38 
Protective garment (0,1) .806 .396 .237 .426 -9.71 
Market/marketing characteristics      
Written contract (0,1) .583 .494 .203 .403 -6.53 
Producer-exporter link (0,1) .806 .396 .396 .489 -6.30 
Collective organizations      
Group membership (0,1) 1 0 .16 .37 -19.50 
Producers sharing buyer (count) 3.64 .99 3.42 1.75 -1.00 
Beans farmers in the village (count) 21.13 8.12 18.88 6.55 -2.29 
Groups in the village (count) 2.94 1.68 2.51 2.09 -1.55 
Group size (count) 22.31 6.65 17.32 2.54 -3.82 
Incentives       
Average producer price, 3kg/carton 71.49 17 68.68 24.1 -2.21 
Extension access (0,1) 1 0 .37 .48 -10.96 
Extension visits (count) 7.76 2.92 3.66 5.16 -6.33 
Credit access (0,1) 1 0 .73 .44 -5.08 
T-statistics are significant at between 1% and 10% level 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006. 
 (i) Farmer characteristics 
GGAP certified producers have an average of 43 years and more schooling years. These 
characteristics correlate with risk taking behavior because of managerial skills gained over 
time and education that helps in decision making. GGAP certified producers have 8 contract 
seasons with a buyer and only 3 seasons for non-GGAP certified ones. More seasons allow 
acquisition of agronomic skills, develops producer-buyer trust and easy adaptability in 
farming. The factors may lead to a higher probability of adopting GGAP.  
  
28 
 
(ii) Farm characteristics 
GGAP certified producers have an average of 1.5 acres of land about two times those of non-
GGAP producers, which is above the national average of 1.0 acre for Kenyan smallholder 
horticultural farms. Besides economies of scale a farm is a proxy for wealth, if used as 
collateral to finance farm assets, for example. All certified producers own an on-farm grading 
shed but only 26% for non certified producers and three times more certified producers use 
protective garments than non-certified ones. Use of crop buyer’s spray teams, or high cost 
may be the cause of low use of protective garments by non-certified producers. Farm size, a 
grading shed and protective garments strengthens farmer capacity and promotes food quality 
and safety. This would most likely influence successful adoption of GGAP certification.  
(iii) Market/marketing characteristics 
An average of 58% of GGAP producers use written contracts twice more than the non-GGAP 
producers indicating that information asymmetry and volatile market conditions might be 
greater for non-GGAP than GGAP certified producers. Only 40% of non-GGAP producers 
are linked to the market by an exporter, two times less than GGAP certified producers. A 
written contract enhances flow and sharing of technical information on produce quality and 
safety and linkage by financially capable exporters opens external resources to producers and 
assured market access. Use of written contract and linkage by exporters will influence GGAP 
adoption. 
(iv) Collective organizations 
Social interactions increase knowledge transfer through demonstration effect and intra-
competition. All certified farmers belong to a producer group and only 16% for non certified 
ones. A certified farmer knows an average of 21 beans producers in the village while producer 
groups are larger for GGAP certified producers than for non-certified ones. Large producer 
groups have critical mass, possible low amortized per unit certification costs, and increased 
negotiation power to adopt GGAP more easily while knowledge about competition from other 
producers in the village might motivate producers to adopt GGAP as a differentiation 
strategy.  
(v) Incentives 
Certified producers have a higher producer price than non certified producers. A higher 
producer price expectation can attract interest and willingness to adopt GGAP certification. 
All certified producers compared to 40% of non-certified producers have access to extension 
services and 2 times more contact visits with a service provider. Extension imparts technical 
know-how and strengthens human capital capacity to farm quality and safe produce such as 
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scouting for pests on farms (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). All certified producers have a bank 
account signifying a higher possibility of using smallholder-linked credit to finance farm 
assets. This may suggest a higher likelihood of adopting GGAP adoption for those with more 
contact visits and possibility of credit access.  
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the factors that affect the successful adoption of GGAP certification are 
analyzed. The estimated probit coefficients are reported in Table 2.2. 
Most variables are significant at between 1% and 10% level. The model correctly predicts 
GGAP adoption decision for 96% of the sample. The percent of correct forecasts is calculated 
as the total number of predictions as a percentage of the number of observations. The link test 
returns an insignificant linear predicted value squared, (p-value= 0.954) at 5% level showing 
the model is correctly specified. The model has a significant Wald chi-square (17) of 492 at 
5% level. An examination of the appropriateness of the model using Bayesian Information 
Criteria’s goodness of fit statistics indicate that the model with the interaction of direct market 
link and supply contract and age in quadratic form generates a difference of 5.48 in BIC'. This 
provides very strong support for interaction and the quadratic form for a producer’s age. 
Grading shed, producer group, bank account and access to extension service variables have 
been dropped from the model because they perfectly predict certification. Access to extension 
is replaced by the number of extension visits.  
The marginal effects indicate that farmer and farm characteristics and collective organizations 
have the highest marginal influences on smallholders’ successful adoption of GGAP. On the 
other hand, marketing characteristics have the highest marginal influence on unsuccessful 
adoption of GGAP. Singly, ownership of protective garment has the highest positive marginal 
effect of 8.7% on the successful adoption of GGAP while the number of farmers in the village 
has the highest marginal decrease of 1.6% in the success of GGAP adoption. Farming 
experience has a higher positive marginal effect of 6.8% on the success of GGAP adoption. 
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Table 2.2: Factors affecting successful adoption of GGAP certification  
 Without interactions With interactions 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coef. 
 
p-value 
 
Coef. 
 
p-value 
Marginal 
Effects  
Farmer characteristics      
Farmer age (yrs) -.055 0.043 1.042 0.000 .039*** 
Age squared - - -.013 0.000 -.000*** 
Schooling (yrs) -.040 0.687 -.168 0.242 -.006 
Farming experience (yrs) 1.195 0.002 1.812 0.002 .068*** 
Seasons with buyer (count) .162 0.001 .306 0.001 .011*** 
Farm characteristics      
Area under beans (acres) 1.318 0.002 2.039 0.000 .076*** 
Owns protective garment (0,1) 1.683 0.011 2.330 0.009 .087*** 
Marketing characteristics      
Producer-exporter link (0,1) -3.625 0.005 4.061 0.049 .151* 
Written contract (0,1) -1.424 0.083 5.771 0.001 .215*** 
Link*Contract (0,1) - - -10.41 0.000 -.388*** 
Collective organizations      
Groups in the village (count) .703 0.017 1.436 0.000 .054*** 
Group size (count) .339 0.000 .518 0.000 .019*** 
Farmers in the village (count) -.163 0.009 -.426 0.000 -.016*** 
Farmers sharing buyer (count) .690 0.009 1.232 0.001 .046*** 
Incentives       
Average price, 3kg/carton (KE) -.031 0.391 -.068 0.060 -.003** 
Extension visits (count) .225 0.040 .204 0.048 .008** 
Regional dummy      
Upper Mwea region (0,1) .172 0.730 -.050 0.940 -.002 
Constant -6.26 0.126 -34.42 0.000  
Wald chi2 (df) 78.99 (15) 492 (17)  
Log pseudolikelihood -25.1  -16.8   
BIC' (diff) -166.6  -172.0 (5.48)  
Correct classification 96%     
Link test  0.701  0.954  
Number of observations 249  249   
  *, **, *** means significant at 90, 95 and 99% levels 
On farmer characteristics, age, farming experience and contract seasons with a buyer have 
positive and significant effect on GGAP adoption. As hypothesized, certification shows a 
quadratic relationship with age. Age suggests the importance of innovativeness and 
willingness to take risk in food quality and safety markets. Young producers might adopt 
GGAP standard to differentiate themselves from mainstream producers. Experienced 
producers acquire learned farming skills over time, which are crucial in adoption. Although 
there are training modules providing information on standards, certification and location of 
third party certifiers (see Ashraf et al., 2009) past experience endows producers with the 
capacity to make risky farming decisions more reasonably than new entrants. More contract 
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seasons beget partnerships and trust where a producer can access information and assistance 
to adopt quality standards as observed in the Kenyan horticultural sector with local 
supermarkets (Reardon et al., 2003; Narrod et al., 2009). Buyers might also support 
smallholders with whom they have regular trade seasons to get certified as a source of reliable 
and consistent supplies. These results suggest that an innovation that increases input and 
output risks constrains elderly less experienced and lowly connected producers.  
An acre under beans increases the likelihood of adopting GGAP standard by 7.6%. Because 
individual smallholders cannot seek certification, this variable needs careful interpretation. 
For instance, the 2006 estimates show that only 34 individual large farms and 352 producer 
groups had certification (Moeller, 2006). However, food quality and safety can be observed 
efficiently on smallholdings through family labor to GGAP certification requirements because 
of commitment than with hired labor in large farms (Jaffee, 2003). But as a proxy for wealth, 
farm size might also signify ability and willingness to innovate. Because of the ability to 
produce high output volumes at low per unit costs, large farm sizes are preferred as a source 
of outputs in short supply at certain times of the year by exporters or local supermarkets. 
Our result on ownership of protective garments and GGAP’s adoption is three pronged: crop 
hygiene for food safety, personal welfare for producer/worker health and environmental 
conservation. Use of protective garments reduces health hazards and ailments for instance 
(Okello and Swinton, 2010). Besides, assuming proper use of a calibrated sprayer, application 
and disposal of pesticides, environmental protection is observed (GGAP, 2010). Our data 
showed low levels of ownership of protective garments for non certified producers which 
means that the producers could be using spray teams (Graffham et al. 2007).  
An already monitored short supply chain reduces likelihood of GGAP adoption by about 
39%. This confirms our hypothesis that where a buyer finds product quality and safety 
sufficient to serve alternative less demanding markets, then certifying closely monitored 
producers is postponed. Quality monitoring and enforcement is common for outsourced 
supplies by large firms to complement own farm supplies. It is also not uncommon for big 
companies to use their certificate to market supplies from outside (Ouma, 2010). It has been 
shown elsewhere that some buyers segregate produce from smallholders for the less strict 
quality markets (Jaffee, 2003).  
An increase in the number of producer groups, group size and the number of producers 
sharing a buyer by one increases the likelihood of GGAP adoption by between 2% and 5%. 
The result indicates that organized and commonly shared values can influence adoption of an 
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innovation collectively either materially and financially. Place et al., (2004) have similar 
conclusions about farmer groups in horticulture farming. The number of beans producers in a 
village is negative and significant. With concentration of producers in a village, easy producer 
group formation and joint search for certification is expected, which is not. The possibility is 
that many are independent producers serving alternative markets. This result shows how 
critical mass without an organized framework can hinder adoption of a competitive 
innovation in a dynamic marketing environment. Lack of organization and networking is 
considered a hindrance in the exploitation of social capital among small farmers and traders 
alike (Feder and Umali, 1993; Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006).  
A higher producer price predicts less likelihood to certification. Higher prices can motivate 
producers but producers seem to adopt certification for other reasons. It could also mean that 
non certified producers serve alternative markets because of the price incentive. Extension 
visits are important success factors in adoption. Knowledgeable smallholders will be resilient 
and confident in adopting agronomic practices that emphasize value for money, personal and 
environmental care. This result confirms the importance of training in facilitating 
understanding of information on technical issues e.g., MRLs, traceability and farm audits. 
Training minimizes the severity of information asymmetry between upstream and 
downstream market participants leading to widespread diffusion of food quality and safety 
standards.   
Generally, the model explains the role of the time period a farmer has produced for the export 
market on the adoption of certification more realistically compared to Asfaw et al., (2010) 
who found a negative relationship. A producer with more exposure on export market trends 
on quality and certification has more possibilities of adjusting with innovations because 
anticipated changes motivate accumulation of the necessary knowledge and investments.  
The model shows that age has significant positive influence on successful adoption of GGAP 
certification but up to a certain limit. Asfaw et al., (2010) found age to be insignificant. A 
producer’s age has a basis for risk-taking behavior. Younger producers are more likely to take 
risky investments by acquiring credit and seeking the required expertise by dedicating time 
for training either in farmer-schools or privately. The motivation is to run farming as a 
business rather than a part-time occupation and on the need to succeed. Full time farming 
influences positive adoption of traceability for instance (Souza Monteiro and Caswell, 2009). 
On the role of producer groups, our results match those of Okello (2005), Asfaw et al., (2010) 
and Muriithi et al., (2010) who found a positive relationship with adoption of International 
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Food Safety and EUREPGAP standards. The model shows that non-land assets such as 
protective garments form some threshold investment for inclusion in the adoption of quality 
standards. It is noted that inadequate non-land assets may exclude smallholders from food 
quality and safety market chains (Reardon et al., 2009).  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Global Good Agricultural Practices (GGAP, formerly EUREPGAP) has been a key private 
standard in Kenya’s fruit and vegetables horticultural sub-sector for the last 6 years. However, 
relatively few studies have looked at the factors that affect its successful adoption at the farm 
level. This study presents an empirical analysis of successful adoption of GGAP by French 
beans producers.  
A higher probability of successful adoption of GGAP is associated with more farming 
experience, contract seasons with a buyer, land under beans, ownership of protective 
garments, higher number of producer groups and farmers sharing a buyer in a village, large 
producer groups and more extension visits.  
For French beans producers, capacity to invest in farm assets and to nurture more contract 
seasons with buyers is a driving force for successful certification. The requirement to have 
upfront capital expenditure on farm assets is recognized as an exclusion threat for 
smallholders trying to access high value chains that emphasize on adoption of quality 
standards (Reardon et al., 2009). However, traders have promoted adoption of quality 
standards among producers and firms that trade within their chains by requiring adoption for 
trade conformity (Karipidis et al., 2009). There is evidence in Graffham et al., (2007) and 
Ashraf et al., (2009) that a cost-sharing arrangement between exporters and smallholders can 
ease costs of adopting GGAP standard. Our result indicates that more contract seasons with an 
upstream market participant can enhance successful adoption of GGAP. Farm assets can be 
financed through smallholder based credit schemes that are available in most commercial 
banks
9
.  
In terms of policy, reliance on organized producer groups may be a more effective way to co-
opt smallholders in farm gate private quality and safety standards. Organized groups are 
closer to the producers compared to individual farmers, can amass trust, resources and self-
monitoring mechanisms in the establishment of a common certification platform. Whether 
                                                 
9
 For example, Equity Bank has an agricultural loan for the purchase of farm inputs and equipment, Cooperative 
Bank has Maziwa loan for dairy producers, Kenya Commercial Bank has Mavuno loan for tea producers and 
Family Bank has Majani Plus for the purchase of farm inputs and equipment. Loans are repaid from final 
product revenues. 
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smallholders’ have proper leadership and management capabilities to foster cohesion and 
sustainability of organized producer groups needs further research.  
Extension services and farming experience improve a producer’s capacity in the adoption 
process. GGAP protocols are specific on traceability and audit of pesticides used on the farm 
e.g., how, when, how much of pesticides use and where to dispose. Training modules by 
public or private staff on product quality and safety requirements can enhance widespread 
compliance and adoption rates in smallholdings (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Nationally, there 
are outreach programs tailored to educate producers through ‘barazas10’ on pesticides use and 
application, certification and traceability. One would be interested, however to know how 
costs of buyer sanctioned private extension services are appropriated to final producer price.  
On the other hand, use of short closely monitored supply chains, more beans producers in a 
village and a higher producer price lower the odds of successful adoption of GGAP. The low 
success among those in short closely monitored supply chains and independent producers 
means that the reach for quality assurance is significantly lower for most producers. The price 
incentive seems to operate more efficiently outside certification. These results might imply 
that alternative markets for non certified produce are very strong. This is emphasized in Jaffee 
(2003) and Ouma (2010). There is need therefore to investigate how smallholders choose 
short closely monitored supply chains because the chains seem to hinder adoption of 
standards and subsequent orientation into alternative markets. 
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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of private quality and assurance schemes in international trade is defining 
market access in high value chains. The prime concern for small-scale producers is whether 
price premiums are realizable due to compliance. Using French beans marketing, the authors 
find that GlobalGAP certification, produce traceability, number of suppliers, competition for 
supplies, direct procurement, a good road network, and supply contracts have positive 
farmgate price effects for smallholders. Potential policy implications are drawn.  
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1 INTRODUCTION: GLOBALGAP QUALITY ASSURANCE SCHEME IN KENYA 
GlobalGAP (GGAP; global good agricultural practices) has received much attention in the 
literature on food safety and quality as a standard of choice among retailers in the European 
Union (EU) since its formation as detailed in Glassheim and Nagel (2006). GGAP is a 
business-to-business standard, which is not communicated to the consumer by labeling. 
GGAP, initially EurepGAP, was developed in 1997; it started in Kenya with the certification 
of five Kenyan farmer groups in 2005. Through the Kenyan umbrella horticultural 
association, Fresh Produce Exporters Association, the Kenyan good agricultural practices, 
KenyaGAP was benchmarked to GGAP in 2007. Currently, there are approximately 400 
GGAP-certified farms in Kenya: 34 individual farms and 352 farmer groups. It is among the 
most widely used certification programs in the fruit and vegetables sub-sector in Kenya. 
Nevertheless, the program can have a negative impact on resource-poor smallholder 
producers. Certification requires compliance with a catalogue of standards regarding the 
production process. Annual farm audits aim at checking continuous compliance. In most 
cases, the farmer pays the costs associated with auditing and GGAP certification. GGAP has 
two certification options: one for single farmers (Option 1) and one for a group of farmers 
(Option 2). Most farmers in Kenya are certified under Option 2. The complexity and 
transparency of the program with its numerous control points and the necessary technical and 
administrative requirements are challenging in a small-scale farming situation (e.g., Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 1999, Hobbs, 2003). For instance, compliance requires 
maintenance of pesticide application protocol records, evidence of training on crop hygiene, 
testing of soil and irrigation water, and assessment of on-farm and off-farm crop handling 
facilities (GLOBALGAP, 2007). Quantitative estimates of the cost of initial compliance and 
certification ranges from US$6000 to US$8000 (Jaffee, 2003). Continuous compliance and 
renewal of certificates is estimated to cost US$200 per month. Graffham, Karehu, and 
McGregor (2007) have shown that the costs of certification and audits for organized 
smallholder producers are about US$632 and US$154, respectively. More recently, Muriithi, 
Mburu, and Ngigi (2010) have indicated that input costs (fertilizers and other agro-chemicals) 
though not standardized, heavily weigh on initial adoption of GGAP for smallholders. To help 
small farmers cost sharing systems are in place where organized smallholders, the buyer or 
exporter, and nongovernmental organizations contribute to an arrangement to establish GGAP 
certification, and GGAP maintenance is shared between organized producers and exporters. 
The bulk of maintenance costs (86%; Graffham et al., 2007), are paid by the exporter. 
Although compliance and certification might result in improved on-farm processes, lower 
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transaction costs, or higher product quality, monetary benefits are less explicit. Some studies 
conclude that the most important barrier for smallholder producers is the lack of visible 
rewards for GGAP certification (e.g., Chia-Hui Lee (2006), Commission of European 
Communities (2006), Graffham et al., (2007), Minae, Casey, Poisot, Santacoloma & Termine, 
2006; Thiagarajan, Busch & Frahm, 2005). Similarly, Glassheim and Nagel (2006) argue that 
farmers are not able to quantify the impact of being GGAP certified on their farm business. 
Ouma (2010) from interviews with exporters of fresh fruit and vegetables found that not a 
single respondent claimed to have received a price premium from retailers for GGAP-certified 
products.   
Therefore, the aim of this study is to quantify the monetary reward for GGAP certification at 
the farm level. It does so by estimating a hedonic function of French beans producer prices 
econometrically using a panel of 249 Kenyan farmers. Our analysis contributes to the 
literature by providing a first quantitative assessment of the implicit price premium attached 
to GGAP certification. Minot and Ngigi (2004) have cited French beans as a success story in 
the horticultural export sector. The vegetable has higher financial gains per acre compared to 
traditional crops like maize. French beans have also been a fresh produce export since the 
mid-1980s, have wider acceptability among producers, easy agronomic practices, and a short 
growing period and established European markets. Local consumption has a modest standing 
at 6.6 % of all food items for the upper income consumers and at 11.9 % for the middle 
income consumers (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000). Internationally, computed figures 
from European Union (EU) trade database show  considerable penetration of French beans 
from Kenya to the EU market between 2002 and 2007 with remarkable 26.88% share by 
value and 12.64% share by volume, respectively  (EUROSTAT, 2009). The major export 
destination remains the United Kingdom (UK), which receives more than 60 % of its total 
French beans imports from Kenya. Although Reardon and Farina (2002) argue that the EU 
market is a challenge for imports from developing economies due to the dominance of 
European continental supermarkets and supply chain standards that demand quality, 
certification and traceability, Jaffee (2003) states that French beans face minimal 
phytosanitary sanctions in the UK and Dutch markets. In addition, FAOSTAT (2009) shows 
that the export price per kilo of French beans increased over the years from US$0.81 in 1990 
to US$3.21 in 2007. 
In the following section, we develop a conceptual framework of producer price formation and 
third-party certification. In Section 3, the econometric model is presented. The methodology, 
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data and descriptive statistics are introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the results 
of the econometric analysis and discuss our results and some conclusions in Section 6.  
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
From the foregoing, compliance with third-party certification schemes might be motivated by 
monetary, i.e., higher and/or more stable product prices, and non-monetary attributes, e.g., 
reduced transaction costs, higher stability of business relationships with exporters, and 
strategic issues like market access. As GGAP has become the standard in EU retailing, we 
cannot easily assess whether a premium is paid by final consumers or not. As compliance 
with GGAP is not communicated to consumers but rather among intermediate channel 
participants, it might well be that the premium at this stage is small. Nonetheless, other 
advantages in the value chain (e.g., less controlling, etc.) might allow for reimbursing 
producers for the extra costs of complying with GGAP. In this article, we test whether 
producers generate a price premium for the compliance with GGAP. We borrow much from 
the literature on product prices, which reveals that commodity prices vary with quality 
characteristics (e.g., Bierlen & Grunewald, 1995; Carew, 2000; Espinosa & Goodwin, 1991; 
Estes, 1986; Estes & Smith, 1996; Goodwin, Fuller, Capps, & Asgill, 1988; Parker & 
Zilberman, 1993;  Tronstad, 1993; Tronstad, Huthoefer, & Monke, 1992; Waugh, 1928). 
More recently, Wollni and Zeller (2007) have found that nature of production, e.g., organic, 
state of origin or regional differences, and participation in marketing organizations to be 
significant factors affecting market prices. 
Following Hobbs (2003), Graffham et al. (2007) and Okello and Swinton (2007), certification 
costs are disincentives to the adoption of GGAP. If we use Humphrey’s (2005) argument that 
small-scale level of production, low level of coordination and cooperation among 
smallholders may lead to high unit costs of compliance and certification for individual 
producers, then those not willing or not able to obtain certification have two options. They 
may opt for the local or export markets for noncertified products (Jaffee, 2003; Ouma, 2010). 
Alternatively, they can opt out of production (Graffham et al., 2007). Noncertified producers 
may have lower production costs, but then also lack a price premium compared to their 
certified counterparts. However, Waweru (2006) contends that the costs of certification may 
be absorbed more easily by way of amortization through group marketing, where smallholders 
pool land and financial resources. Economic theory indicates that, assuming high quality 
induces higher costs and buyers are willing to buy the high-quality product, to reach 
equilibrium, additional costs must be covered by a higher market price (Unnevehr, 2000). The 
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benefits that smallholder producers achieve through joint producer marketing constitute 
incentives. For instance, Belleti, Burgassi, Marescotti, and Scaramuzzi (2005) identify market 
access and premium prices. Moll and Igual (2005) mention a higher cost efficiency and 
Giraud-Héraud, Rouached, and Soler (2006) cite reduction of failure in product safety as 
some of the benefits of product differentiation through labeling. However, in the business-to-
business GGAP scheme, costs may not necessarily be covered by a corresponding higher 
price. 
Nevertheless, farm gate buyers might have an incentive to offering higher prices to GGAP 
certified French bean producers to mitigate quality uncertainty and honor reduced transaction 
costs. As described by Okello (2005), the observed farm gate producer price is derived from 
the export market price less transaction costs faced by a farm gate buyer. On each market day, 
buyers purchase beans from producers in a given shed following some criteria reflecting the 
market served. We assume the prices offered to be auction prices based on quality and other 
factors facing the buyer on the market day. Hence, smallholder producers are price takers. 
Consequently, assuming that small producers pursue the goal of monetary gain, the observed 
farm gate producer prices can be attributed to the production method used by the farmer, 
spatial, seasonal, quality variations, and other factors.  
Conceptually, assume an exporter i is sourcing fresh produce directly at farm level to ship it to 
export markets in Western Europe. All exporters face the same export market price of French 
beans Pep. However, transaction costs might vary across exporters TCi. Therefore, the 
observed farm gate prices differ due to the exporter’s characteristics: Pfi = Pep – TCi. This 
equation implies that an exporter facing increasing transaction costs will offer a lower price 
fiP to the farmer. Introducing third-party certification like GGAP might cause two different 
effects. On the one hand, depending on the demand from export markets, exporters might be 
forced to look for certified producers. In such a case, the exporter needs to offer higher prices 
to secure supply. Similarly, exports of certified products might result in savings on transaction 
costs, which the exporter might channel through to producers. On the other hand, exporter-
sponsored training and monitoring of GGAP may lead to the problem of hold-up and 
subsequently offers exporters the possibility to exercise market power. However, as long as a 
market for noncertified produce exists, such behavior appears to be less realistic. 
Following the conceptual framework, farm gate buyers procuring from certified producers 
may face lower information, monitoring and enforcement costs compared to procuring from 
noncertified producers. Further, a buyer is assured to get produce of a certain high and safe 
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quality. Thus, if lower transaction costs and high product quality generate market efficiencies, 
then farm gate buyers may offer higher farm gate prices. We hypothesize that certified 
farmers impose lower information and transaction costs on buyers and presumably supply 
higher quality produce. Such producers will be offered higher French bean prices than 
noncertified producers.   
Beside transaction costs, a buyers’ price offer might vary due to characteristics of the export 
destination and additional services. For instance, retailers’ interest on product variety might 
result in varying buying behavior and varying prices at the export market level (Jaffee, 2003). 
Furthermore, buyers seek minimal production and distributional risks, and therefore, may 
have an incentive to offer producers with a functioning traceability system, higher prices 
(Brousseau & Codron, 1998; Golan et al., 2004; Reardon & Farina, 2002;). 
The role of intermediaries in horticultural procurement in Kenya has received much attention 
(see Graffham et al., 2007; Jaffee, 2003). Intermediaries are argued to have local expertise 
with lower produce assembling costs compared to exporting firms. However, intermediaries 
generally add transaction costs to the farm gate price. Therefore, export firms may prefer 
direct procurement of French beans from smallholder producers to control quality, produce 
identification and segregation. Traders that choose intermediaries over direct procurement 
may be small investment firms seeking to minimize transaction costs. Firms procuring 
directly from smallholder producers could be large; frequently, large horticultural farms 
involved directly in exporting source additional quantities from small farmers to fill gaps. If 
quality and safety benefits motivate a buyer to source directly, such a firm could be in a 
position to trade-off arising transaction costs for product quality. To sum up, it is 
hypothesized that shorter supply chains with direct procurement offer higher French bean 
prices to producers than intermediaries. 
On the buyer’s side, Graffham et al. (2007) note that organized production reduces logistic, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs arising from sparse distribution of farms in a rural set up. 
Additionally, organized producers have some sort of bargaining power. It is thus hypothesized 
that organized producers will receive higher French bean prices. 
The farm gate price for French beans will be influenced by site and time specificities. 
Martinez and Poole (2004) have identified the perishable nature of fresh vegetables as key to 
quasi-rents by buyers. For example, French beans are harvested early in the morning, and 
collected between 10 a.m. and noon every day. This time specificity may expose farmers to 
post-harvest crop handling opportunism on the part of buyers through delayed French beans 
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collection during the market day. Assuming smallholder producers are rational suppliers, it is 
expected that farmers would seek to sell their harvested crop as soon as possible to avoid 
product deterioration from strong heat. Furthermore, the quality of collected beans will vary 
with each harvesting day as the season progresses since beans will lose vigor and turgidity as 
the number of harvestings increase. French bean quality will also be affected by on- and off-
farm crop handling activities such as grading and transportation through bruising and 
breakages. Another potential influence on observed price would be the emerging supply of 
beans from Southern Europe during the June-October season. Changing market conditions 
will affect prevailing buyer practices such as whether the purchasing behavior is consistent or 
intermittent and whether the buyer-producer exchange relationship is strongly or weakly 
enforceable. Therefore, the arising buyer opportunism, quality and market information 
asymmetries, adopted marketing practices, and on-season for European suppliers may 
generate varying prices over the season.  
Jaffee (2003) indicates that sparse location of small farms and poor roads require logistic 
investments such as pre-cooling facilities, packing houses, vehicles, and basic collection 
stations to reduce on- and off-farm crop losses. Omamo (1998) finds that the presence of road 
or marketing infrastructure, e.g., producer groups and central collection points, etc., increases 
the efficiency of both marketing and production through reduction of transaction costs and 
ensures more competitive pricing conditions in marketing. Thus, good quality roads may 
decrease trader’s transportation costs, and subsequently the cost per unit of commodity traded. 
Economically, growing regions subject to good quality roads are thus hypothesized to have 
lower logistic and post-harvest crop handling costs, and hence are characterized by higher 
French bean producer prices. Previous studies show that producer groups with 15 to 20 
homogeneous producers within a radius of 1.5 km are subject to reduced costs of assembling 
produce (Natural Resources Institute, 2002; Nyaga, 2007). However, whether such cost 
reduction translates into higher producer prices is an empirical question. 
3 SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In order to test the existence of GGAP price premium at producer level, the following model 
is estimated: 
  kkfik XCP 0  1 
where Pfik is the farm-level price paid to producer k by exporter i. C is a dummy variable 
representing GGAP certification, and X is a vector of spatial, seasonal, marketing and quality 
factors that may influence producer prices. The estimated coefficient ω represents the price 
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premium of certification. Due to the time-series cross-sectional nature of the dataset, a fixed-
effects or a random-effects estimator can be used. However, the time-invariant nature of 
almost all explanatory variables forces us to stick to the random-effects model. That is, the 
error term  is assumed to be randomly distributed over producers and uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. But when time-series cross-sectional data have a short time series and 
large panel, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms  related to a specific 
panel or producer, k arise. Our data have 6 observations for each of the 249 producers. 
Consequently, a feasible generalized least squares model, which takes account of short time 
series and allows estimation in the presence of autocorrelation across panels, is preferred. 
Because we assume the existence of a GGAP price premium independent of the French 
beans’ grade, the dependent variable, Pfik, represents the average of extra fine and fine grades. 
Equation (1) has been estimated using a semi-log linear approach for simplicity purposes. 
This allows us to interpret estimated coefficients as percentage changes. Further, considering 
that certification premium may not be constant given changing availability of beans in 
competing production regions of Southern European, GGAP is interacted with the time 
variable to capture the variation of certification premiums over the season. Additionally, 
producers in certain administrative locations may be favored by locality differences such as 
good road networks. Thus, location and type of road are interacted in the final model to 
generate a coefficient of quality road networks.  
 
4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data on producer prices have been selected from 249 Kenyan French bean producers 
surveyed from 24 villages of Mwea Tebere, Kirinyaga District in 2006. The identification and 
selection of respondents started in April 2006 through village administrators (headmen) and 
six trained enumerators. During this period, farmers had already planted French beans and 
anticipated harvesting in June 2006. Due to unequal distribution of villages within the 
administrative location, the study area was divided into four sub-regions: Tebere, Nyangati 
and Murinduko in upper Mwea, and Mwea in lower Mwea based on their demarcation along 
Rivers Nyamindi, Murubara, Project Murubara, and the Mwea Canal. Villages were listed and 
a random sample of six villages selected per region. Producers were then selected conditional 
on the existence of French bean crop due for harvesting in June. Villages had between 1 and 
37 smallholders, 100 organized in producer groups, and 149 independent farmers. In May 
2006, all producers were interviewed on socio-economic, production and marketing aspects 
using a short questionnaire. Specific data included producer identity, farm area under beans, 
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social networks, GGAP certification, supply contracts, and nature of road networks. 
Collection of price data
11
 involved farm visits and interviews during harvesting, sorting, and 
grading. This procedure allowed for the observation of post-farm crop handling practices such 
as sorting, washing, grading, and packaging etc., as well as the identification of exchange 
transactions like receipting, trace-back elements, type of buyers, and connections, etc. French 
beans yield two grades: extra and fine- differentiable through size. Extra is the smallest. 
French beans are harvested over a period of 3-4 weeks. Therefore, over a 3-week period 
prices were collected for each grade on 2 days per week, Monday and Wednesday.  
Table 3.1 shows price-related descriptive statistics based on the factors hypothesized to 
influence farm gate producer prices. The prices are stated in Kenya shillings (KE) per 3 kg, 
which is the standard farm gate packaging weight. The first two columns show the variables 
and their definitions. Column 3 presents the number of producers for which the respective 
variable is equal to one and their share on the total sample.  
Twenty-nine percent of all producers are GGAP certified. Forty percent of the smallholders 
are organized into six producer groups with an average size of 17 producers. All but two 
groups are GGAP certified. Furthermore, the data shows that the number of producers in a 
village varies from 1 to 37. Obviously, larger villages might be potential hubs of marketing 
activities for buyers. Additionally, on average nine buyers compete for French beans supplies 
in a given village. Our data has one buyer that sources exclusively from 61 of the organized 
producers. Fifty one percent of the smallholders are directly linked to exporters and 22 % of 
the smallholders use a full trace-back system carrying farmer’s name, plot, and group name 
and produce collection date. The data show that 69 % of producers sold beans to the same 
buyer all season.  
Verbal and informal arrangements dominate marketing exchanges as only 31 % indicate they 
have a written, supply contract. Thirty-four percent of the producers farm in upper Mwea, 
with most located in the lower region with better access to irrigation. Only 13 % of farmers 
have access to graveled or tarmac roads. Although producers sell both French bean grades, 
94 % report to aim for extra fine grade.   
                                                 
11
 Mwea has had running research projects which makes it easier to get trained research data collectors. 
However, it makes it difficult to obtain information from farmers who complain of too many questionnaires from 
the numerous projects. Thus, in order to elicit price information during harvesting and subsequent follow up for 
un-clarified non-price related data, each respondent was given a mobile phone card worth 2.5€. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the model variables with unconditional and 
conditional distribution of French beans prices (N=249) 
Variable  Defined as Obs. % Mean S. D. Min Max 
Price Price/ 3kg carton 249 - 69.50 22.28 20 200 
Ln(Price) Log of price  249 - 4.18 .35 2.99 5.29 
Week_1_M Monday 1st week 249 - 93.24 15.89 30 200 
Week_1_W Wednesday 1st week 249 - 79.59 13.40 30 150 
Week_2_M Monday 2nd week 249 - 71.11 14.32 25 135 
Week_2_W Wednesday 2nd week 249 - 62.38 18.27 20 135 
Week_3_M Monday 3rd week 249 - 57.72 19.49 20 135 
Week_3_W Wednesday 3rd week 249 - 52.93 22.39 20 135 
NoGap  Non certified producers 177 71.1 68.68 24.06 20 200 
Gap Certified group producers 72 28.9 71.49 17.00 25 100 
Independent Independent producers  149 59.8 67.62 25.36 20 200 
Group Organized producer groups 100 40.2 72.29 16.29 25 100 
Sellers No. of producers in a village 249 - 9.10 6.08 1 37 
Ln(Sellers)  Log of no. of producers 249 - 1.86 0.97 0 3.61 
Buyers No. of buyers in a village 249 - 8.94 2.59 2 12 
Ln(Buyers) Log of no. of buyers 249 - 2.13 .38 .69 2.48 
Intermed Intermediaries in marketing  121 48.6 62.65 23.43 20 200 
Export Exporter used in marketing 128 51.4 75.97 19.00 25 135 
PartialTrace Partial trace-back system 194 77.9 68.79 23.35 20 200 
FullTrace Full trace-back system  55 22.1 71.99 17.81 25 100 
SwitchBuyer Several buyers/ season  76 30.5 61.52 23.85 20 150 
OneBuyer One buyer/season 173 69.5 73 20.61 20 200 
NoContract No supply contract used 171 68.7 66.33 23.77 20 175 
Contract Supply contract used  78 31.3 76.44 16.63 40 200 
LowerMwea Farm located in Lower Mwea 164 65.9 68.44 22.19 20 200 
UpperMwea Farm located in Upper Mwea 85 34.1 71.53 22.33 20 150 
EarthRoad  Access road earth surfaced  216 86.7 70.48 21.38 20 135 
AllRoad Access road all weather 33 13.3 63.08 26.64 30 200 
Fine Fine grade target harvested 14 5.6 66.38 22.39 15 200 
ExtraFine Extra fine grade target 
harvested 
235 94.4 72.61 23.28 20 200 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data using STATA version 9.0. French beans price 
survey, Mwea Tebere April-June 2006.  
 
Turning to the dependent variable, our data show wide between-producer price differences 
with a minimum of KE 20 and a maximum of KE 200 per 3kg. These prices are similar to 
those reported in earlier studies (Graffham et al., 2007). However, the mean declines 
continuously over the six times of sampling from a high of KE 93 to a low of KE 53. We 
found that buyers adopt differing price regimes between producers, within and between 
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marketing days. GGAP-certified producers receive on average higher prices and face a 
smaller variation compared to noncertified producers.  
5 RESULTS OF THE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS  
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 3.2. Multiplying the coefficients by 100 
gives the percentage change in the price of a 3 kg carton of French beans as a result of a 
change in the explanatory variable. Coefficients attached to log number of buyers and 
producers can be interpreted as elasticities. The signs on most of the variables in the model 
are as expected a priori. The variables are jointly statistically significant.  
Table 3.2: Determinants of French Beans’ Price 
 Without interaction effects With interaction effects 
Variable Coeff SE z Coeff SE z 
Gap 0.095** 0.025 3.88 -0.042 0.027 -1.55 
Week_1_W -0.167** 0.009 -19.44 -0.211** 0.010 -20.40 
Week_2_M -0.306** 0.011 -29.26 -0.363** 0.012 -29.88 
Week_2_W -0.480** 0.011 -42.73 -0.562** 0.013 -44.21 
Week_3_M -0.596** 0.012 -51.39 -0.664** 0.013 -51.25 
Week_3_W -0.716** 0.012 -59.77 -0.773** 0.013 -57.78 
Gap*Week_1_W    0.122** 0.018 6.85 
Gap*Week_2_M    0.172** 0.022 7.81 
Gap*Week_2_W    0.249** 0.024 10.44 
Gap*Week_3_M    0.243** 0.025 9.78 
Gap*Week_3_W    0.233** 0.026 9.05 
Group -0.308** 0.043 -7.24 -0.300** 0.041 -7.33 
Ln(Sellers) 0.054** 0.008 7.12 0.062** 0.008 7.60 
Ln(Buyers) 0.033
+
 0.018 1.87 0.033* 0.016 2.05 
Export 0.146** 0.021 6.92 0.124** 0.020 6.36 
FullTrace 0.060* 0.024 2.46 0.046* 0.022 2.10 
OneBuyer 0.076** 0.015 4.97 0.083** 0.015 5.56 
Contract 0.283** 0.029 9.94 0.293** 0.027 10.70 
UpperMwea 0.039* 0.018 2.16 0.045* 0.019 2.32 
AllRoad -0.047* 0.020 -2.38 -0.069** 0.021 -3.35 
UpperMwea*AllRoad    0.122** 0.033 3.70 
ExtraFine -0.001 0.019 -0.07 -0.001 0.018 -0.08 
Constant 4.251** 0.047 90.83 4.282** 0.045 94.72 
Log-likelihood  881.96   934.71  
Wald 
2  (df) 4275.5** (16)  5038.08** (22)  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Results of the first specification in column 1 of Table 3.2 indicate that certified producers 
receive a 9.4 % higher price than noncertified producers. However, the second specification 
clearly indicates that this estimate is not robust to the inclusion of interaction effects. 
Controlling for seasonal effects shows that certified producers experience a lower reduction of 
prices over the season. The econometric analysis suggests that certified producers receive 
between 12 % and 25 % more per 3kg carton compared to noncertified producers. That is, the 
trend of declining prices over the season is less steep for certified producers. In an earlier 
study Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel (2007) find that GGAP-certified producers have a 
KE 5,271 higher net income compared to nonadopters. Further, Graffham et al. (2007) find 
some certified producers to have received an extra KE 5 per kg. These results indicate that 
farm gate buyers are providing incentives for smallholders to improve quality and safety of 
produce through compliance with export market’s product quality schemes. The result 
contradicts the finding in previous literature that a price premium for farmers is non-visible in 
farm gate certification schemes (e.g., Chia-Hui Lee, 2006; Commission of European 
Communities, 2006; Minae et al., 2006; Thiagarajan et al., 2005).  
The time dummy variables (Week_*) indicate distinct price patterns. Prices decrease 
continuously from the first to the third week. Thus, prices are time-dependent and variation in 
time is significant. Martinez and Poole (2004) found temporal specificity to be critical in fresh 
produce markets. When the new harvest starts, producers receive the highest premium. The 
variation in prices may be explained by quality differences arising from physical attributes. 
There is also the possibility that exporters are adopting tactical buying behavior during the 
season. This could either be by purposely setting producer prices high to attract supplies from 
smallholders selling to competitors or by exploiting the perishable nature of French beans 
through delaying acceptance to appropriate lower prices because producers would want to 
avoid economic losses from wasted beans. Finally, the decline of prices over time may also 
reflect possible fluctuations in foreign exchange rates because export market prices are quoted 
in foreign currency. 
Surprisingly, organized producers (Group) experience lower prices compared to independent 
producers. Across both specifications the estimated coefficients suggest approximately 30 % 
lower prices. There might be two explanations. First, organized producers probably receive 
inputs and technical assistance from buyers.. Second, “low quality” farmers might self-select 
into collective marketing. Obviously, buyers appropriate the attendant costs (i.e., inputs, 
technical, assistance, and low quality) to the product price with a consequent reduction in the 
expected final price.  For instance, according to Graffham et al. (2007) producers pay KE 3 
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per kg to offset group costs and investments. In some cases, a management committee 
overseeing group production and marketing may also charge each producer a small fee to 
cover administrative and organizational costs (Narrod et al., 2009), which may be subsumed 
in the groups’ costs-although whether buyers cooperate to deduct the costs from output prices 
is unclear. Combining the two results for certification and organized production suggests that 
organized producers face a higher incentive to comply with GGAP in order to compensate for 
a negative price premium of organized production. This finding implies that independent 
producers, the reference group, might serve different markets or use established long-term 
personal relations with buyers. Furthermore, since 61 % of all organized producers sold to one 
buyer, the coefficient could reflect oligopsonistic market power use by the respective buyer.. 
French beans prices respond positively to the size of the market. Looking at the supply side, 
prices are predicted to be higher in villages with a larger number of suppliers (Ln (Sellers)). 
The prices tend to increase by 6.2 % for a percentage change in the number of producers in a 
village. A higher number of producers in a given area might benefit buyers with lower costs 
of produce assembling and transportation. Similarly, on the demand side, buyers’ competition 
for French beans is predicted to result in a positive effect on farm gate prices. A percentage 
increase in the number of buyers (Ln (Buyers)) leads to a 3.3 % higher price. This means that 
many buyers may yield fair and competitive gains to smallholder producers. Our results 
underline the relevance of competition on markets (Pirrong, 1993). However, the two 
estimates should not be compared directly as they might measure two separate issues. 
Whereas the size of the population of producers here might rather indicate local spots of 
specialization and scale externalities, the number of buyers relates to competitive behavior on 
the market.  
Selling directly to an exporter (Exporter) has a positive effect on prices. Producers that deal 
directly with exporters gain between 12.4 % and 14.6 %per 3 kg carton of French beans. This 
result shows that by surpassing intermediaries, producers could reap a considerable premium. 
It seems economically reasonable for buyers to reward exchange relationships devoid of 
numerous postfarm crop-handling practices. Quantitatively, direct procurement shows the 
second largest positive coefficient after use of a supply contract. 
A fully implemented trace-back system (FullTrace) endows small producers a premium of 
approximately 5-6 %. Identifiable farm produce (i.e., producer, farm plot, and production 
system and collection date) is rewarded by buyers. A trace-back system improves the 
certainty and assurance of buyers on product quality and safety from numerous smallholder 
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producers and offers an opportunity to enforce sanctions following noncompliance. 
Producers’ willingness to be traced is enough evidence that “due diligence” has been 
exercised during crop production and postharvest crop handling. Golan et al. (2004) argue that 
trace-back systems also reduce attendant risks in the market chain such as loss of reputation 
for low quality deliveries, costs of produce rejection on grounds of detected pesticide 
residues, possible liability costs, and yield distribution efficiencies. Our finding indicates that 
reduction in distribution costs has the potential to improve product value and market access 
for marginalized smallholder producers. This is especially critical in markets for quality and 
safety. 
Furthermore, the results show that producers selling to one buyer over the whole season 
(OneBuyer) receive a higher price compared to producers selling to different buyers. The 
estimated coefficient suggests 8 % higher prices. Delayed collection or lacking produce 
collection arrangements might force producers to sell their perishable product at lower prices 
in order to avoid or limit loss through dehydration. The finding could suffer from the 
possibility that producers receiving lower prices change buyers within one season. 
Unfortunately, the underlying reasons remain unknown. . 
In addition, use of a supply contract (Contract) generates 29 % higher French beans prices. 
Quantitatively, this estimate is the single largest positive coefficient. . As expected, this result 
indicates that solidifying exchange relationships through prearranged contracts enhances 
marketing efficiencies. A supply contract that may entail controlled input use and prearranged 
produce collection render accrued benefits to the buyer such as guaranteed supply consistency 
and reliability (Jaffee, 2003). On their part, producers benefit from the knowledge of product 
quality and safety management and access to inputs at preferential terms. The resulting long 
term mutual and trustworthy trading relationship increases coordination and exchange 
efficiencies. Our results suggest that a balance of produce consistency and reliability as well 
as coordination and exchange efficiencies have a positive price effect for producers. 
Consequently, close production and marketing arrangements between buyers and suppliers 
seem essential in minimizing marginalization of smallholder producers in their bid to access 
strict quality markets. 
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficient attached to better roads (AllRoad) has a negative sign. 
However, the interaction effect with location points to a positive impact on prices for 
producers in Upper Mwea (UpperMwea*AllRoad). Producers in Upper Mwea whose farms 
are accessible through all weather roads (UpperMwea*AllRoad) get 12.2 % higher prices, 
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offsetting the negative effect of the all-weather road dummy. . One possible explanation of the 
negative effect of better roads could be the attraction of added costs of marketing 
bureaucracies like horticultural fees which are collected at designated roadblocks. Such 
transaction costs deter buyers from using such routes and may cause low realization of the 
benefits of accessibility thus exacerbating marketing inefficiencies.   
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The proliferation of private quality and assurance schemes in international trade is 
increasingly determining market access in high value chains. Beside market access, the prime 
concern for producers is whether price premiums are realized due to compliance. This is more 
important, especially, for smallholders in developing economies where farm gate private 
standards might impose relatively higher risks due to financial, investment, and organizational 
pressure. GlobalGAP is a key standard in Kenyan horticulture farming and its implementation 
could have potential market access implications for the numerous smallholders involved in 
export marketing.  
Using data from a survey of 249 Kenyan French beans producers we present an econometric 
model to test the existence of a GlobalGAP price premium in observed farm gate producer 
prices. We find that GlobalGAP certification, the use of supply contracts, direct procurement 
by exporters, and the size of markets in a village has a positive effect on producer prices. 
Organized producers receive significantly lower prices. However, the GlobalGAP premium is 
not very large and less important than supply contracts and direct procurement. Of particular 
importance is that GlobalGAP premiums are not constant over one season. The fact that no 
independent producers in our sample have been certified, might indicate the existence of 
alternative marketing channels without requiring investments in a demanding certification 
process. Therefore, further research should center on the question of how a farm governance 
structure, independent or organized production, affects the willingness to apply for GGAP 
certification.  
More buyers in a given village are found to increases prices paid to producers. The converse, 
which is a decline in the number of buyers in certain regions, may be of great concern for 
local regulators because it may expose smallholder producers to opportunistic buying 
behavior. For instance, buyers could exploit time specificity and the perishable nature of 
French beans to delay collection, collude, or falsify grading, and later derive quasi-rents by 
offering low prices. Anecdotal evidence shows that small exporters sporadically offer high 
prices to attract produce, and subsequently exploit the log-in effect. Opportunistic practices 
55 
 
(i.e., diverting contracted produce to competitors, collusion, delayed collection, and falsifying 
grades etc.) have received attention in the works of Kariuki (2003) and CARE-Kenya (2003).  
Thus, local authorities should be trained to develop appropriate capabilities to survey the 
functioning of markets. Indirectly, antitrust policy on local farmers markets can be a 
contribution to agricultural development. 
 Better roads are not found to lead to higher prices in the econometric analysis. One possible 
conclusion is that bureaucratic practices on roads such as horticultural fees and corrupt 
charges in police guarded roadblocks prevent the realization of efficiency gains. Whether this 
is the case cannot be finally answered with the dataset at hand. Therefore, the link between 
institutional quality and the realization of expected efficiency gains due to infrastructure 
improvements requires future research. 
Finally, marketing practices such as a direct linkage to exporters, use of a supply contract, and 
non-switching selling to one buyer could increase producer’s revenues. Informing producers 
of these findings is a relevant step to realize an impact of this analysis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Empirical analysis of factors influencing choice of contractual form and frequency of 
contract renewal in the horticultural sector of developing economies: Kenya’s 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Information asymmetry may intensify food quality and safety risks and increase the costs of 
producing and marketing products from smallholders in developing countries. One economic 
strategy is to use contracts to mitigate farm gate risks. This study uses data from Kenyan 
French beans producers to determine the choice of written contracts and the frequency of 
renewal. The results show that larger groups, post primary education, a higher number of 
extension visits and number of contract seasons with a buyer increase the likelihood of using 
written contracts. On their part, oral contracts are likely with higher producer prices and a 
higher number of producers in the village. The results indicate that if markets seek premium 
quality and stability written contracts are preferable but in markets that are very competitive 
and with high transaction costs oral contracts dominate. The frequency of contract renewal 
increases with prices if given during planting, spot-cash payments, farm distance from 
irrigation water source, sales receipting and traceability, market linkage by an export firm and 
large farm sizes but decreases with a higher number of buyers in the village. The results 
suggest that price incentives, transaction costs, reputation and image considerations shape 
farm level contract renewals in fresh produce markets.   
 
Key words: Contract forms; Contract choice; Smallholders; Developing countries; Kenya  
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1. Introduction: motivation for vertical integration and contracting 
The demand for food quality and safety by food retailers in the European Union (EU) and 
United States (US) export markets for fruit and vegetables have potential negative 
implications for smallholders in developing countries. Because of financial and expertise 
constraints, smallholders cannot invest in the required food quality and safety infrastructure, 
or comply with Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs), traceability and certification (Eom, 1992; 
World Health Organization, 1998; Food and Agriculture Organization, 1999; Lee and 
Hathaway, 1999; González and Nigh, 2005). Besides increasing potential health risk in the 
supply chain this inability reduces smallholders’ competitiveness in international trade. 
Strategies to mitigate food quality and safety failure include complete vertical coordination 
where food retailers shift responsibility to suppliers in relational contracts (Kilmer et al. 2001; 
Dolan and Humprey, 2004; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). At the farm level, buyers use 
contracts in form of modified extension with strict control and monitoring of critical inputs or 
more loosely defined oral agreements. The choice of either contract may have implications for 
smallholders. In a closely monitored contract, smallholders get inputs, technical advice on 
pesticides use, pest scouting and timely produce collection (Henson and Jaffee, 2008). This 
minimizes producers’ input constraints and product quality and safety risks, and improves 
market certainty. However, producers have limited production decisions which are vested in 
the firm. Oral contracts shift most production risks to the producer with a promise for output 
purchases during the harvest. This exposes producers to input and market uncertainties but 
with the freedom of making production and marketing decisions. The sustainability of export 
marketing largely depends on farm level relationships between producers and exporters. The 
frequency of contract renewals defines whether logical production planning and the 
management of farms as business units can be guaranteed. Frequent contract renewals allow 
producers to plan future production plans by acquiring inputs, investing in farm assets and 
putting more land into production. This can potentially reduce input costs if producers 
purchase in bulk for current and future production cycles, increase market access and stabilise 
farm incomes. The frequency might however subject producers to prices below competition. 
Conversely less frequent contract renewals force producers to switch enterprises or drop out 
of production due to the inherent market uncertainty. This implies production and marketing 
decisions are unstable. Nevertheless, less frequent contract renewals could suit short run profit 
seekers with tactical entry and exit in the market. With the entry of quality and safety 
concerns in the food chain, closely monitored and frequent contract renewals present an 
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opportunity for smallholders to comply while oral contracts and less frequent contract 
renewals in business might hinder such a move.  
Horticultural contracts have been used since the late 1990s and continue to play a key role in 
production and export marketing in Kenya (Jaffee and Little, 1994; Okello and Swinton, 
2007). International bilateral contracts between importers and exporters in UK fresh markets 
and their impact in developing countries suppliers have received a bigger share of studies 
(Barret et al., 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 2004; Henson and Jaffee, 2008). An attempt on 
farm level contracts has been made in Obare and Kariuki, (2003), Neven and Reardon, 
(2004), Okello, (2005) and Masakure and Henson, (2005). Yet, there still exist not enough 
comprehensive empirical studies to explain determinants of horticultural contracts and their 
persistence in Kenya’s smallholder horticulture. This paper focuses on the option of 
contracting, more specifically, the analysis of a farmer’s choice to use contracts and which 
form between written or oral. Further, it analyzes the frequency of contract renewal. The 
econometric analysis uses extensive survey data from Kenyan French beans producers. We 
show that written contracts are more likely with large group size, more extension services and 
contract seasons with a buyer. Oral contracts are more likely with more number of producers 
in a village and higher producer prices. Contract renewal increases with price knowledge at 
planting and spot cash payments, farm distance to irrigation water source, sales receipting and 
traceability, market linkage by an export firm and large farm size but decrease with the 
number of competing buyers in a village. We find that written contracts are preferable for 
quality and stability goals and oral contracts for very competitive market regions and with 
high transaction costs. Further, price incentives, transaction costs, reputation and image 
considerations determine renewal of contracts in farm level fresh produce markets. It is 
concluded that contracts are transitional strategies to access high value chains and alternative 
markets.  
The rest of the paper is restructured as follows. Background information on horticultural 
contracting in developing countries with a special case for Kenya is presented under sub-
section 1.1. Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework on choice of written contracts and 
frequency of contract renewal in French beans marketing. The empirical specification and the 
methodology are discussed in Section 3 and in Section 4 the data set is presented. Empirical 
results are reported in Section 5 followed by Conclusions in Section 6.  
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1.1.Horticultural contracting in developing countries: Kenya’s experience  
Kenya’s horticulture is driven by smallholders, large scale and company farms (Jaffee and 
Little, 1994). Company farms are the exporters, have farms of different sizes, export to 
different countries and to different importers in the wider EU. Despite production on own 
farms, company farms source open field crops from smallholders and large scale producers to 
fill up gaps, or to serve less discerning quality markets and to maintain product shelves in 
Western food retailers (Jaffee, 2003; Dolan and Humphrey, 2004). Directly, relationships 
between exporters and smallholders are governed by closely controlled and monitored 
contracts with independent producers, an outgrower scheme or producer marketing 
organization (Horticultural Crops Development Authority, 1995). The contracts specify crop 
variety, provide farm inputs e.g., pesticides and fund post-harvest assets like charcoal cooled 
refrigerators (McCulloch and Ota, 2002). Within the controlled model, buyers or donor 
programs support certification of producers (Graffham et al., 2007; Ashraf et al., 2009). 
Exporters may also use intermediaries to initiate informal contracts with smallholders through 
a local broker. As in most developing countries, contracts with intermediaries are oral, 
dependent on social networks e.g., friendship, neighbourhood etc., and are more spot-market 
oriented (Fuentes, 1998; Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Kariuki et al., 2006). The problems associated 
with dual-contractual arrangements are evident. Crop homogeneity creates marketing frictions 
between closely monitored producers and firms because of smallholders’ breach of contracts 
through side-selling contracted produce to competitors (Ouma, 2010). Additionally, 
smallholders’ contracts have high monitoring and oversight costs due to the numbers and 
expanse distribution in growing regions (McCulloch and Ota, 2002).    
The role of contracts in agriculture cannot be overemphasized. They are used for procuring 
agricultural supplies, cushioning partners against price and market risks, correcting input 
market failure, income generation, (Roy, 1972; Glover, 1984), supply chain governance and 
strategy for product quality and safety (Brousseau and Codron, 1998; Hueth et al., 1999; 
Singh, 2002). The use of contracts  is determined by farmer characteristics (e.g., age, 
schooling, experience etc), agribusiness firms’ resources, access to and size of land, 
investment capacity, price uncertainty, the length of the period of contract, the number of 
potential contract producers in a region, nearness to road infrastructure, and membership in 
organized marketing groups (Glover, 1984; Jaffe and Little, 1994; Bercovitz, 1999; Eaton and 
Shepherd, 2001; Sykuta and Parcell, 2002; Martinez and Poole, 2004; Neven and Reardon, 
2004; Fraser, 2005; Okello, 2005). This suggests that contracts can be used to minimize 
production risks and maximize buyers’ quality expectations. Further, it means that there are 
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transaction costs and risk-sharing incentives subsumed in the producer and the buyer that can 
explain the observed contract choices.  In the marketing of fresh fruit and vegetables in the 
EU retailing sector, producers may choose contracts in response to pressure to supply quality 
and safe produce. For buyers, they would offer contracts as a form of risk management in the 
flow of reliable, consistent, quality and safe supplies with incentive tags to motivate 
performance.  
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The conceptual framework looks at the choice to use contracts and the frequency of renewal. 
Information asymmetry on quality and safety yields uncertainty and opportunism in the 
supply chain necessitating design of contracts that minimize risk-aversion and transaction 
costs. What determines use of contracts in French beans marketing? What determines the 
frequency of contract renewals?  
2.1 A model of contract choice in French beans farming 
Resource-poor smallholders are constrained by market changes that affect their incomes by 
erecting market barriers, for instance traceability. Exporters face product supply, consistency, 
reliability and quality risks from outputs outsourced from smallholders, which would lead to 
loss of business profits, markets and reputation. To simultaneously overcome market access 
barriers and outsourcing risks producers and buyers might use contracts. The basis for a 
mutual contract is information asymmetry on product quality and safety, which subjects 
quality assessment to prohibitive costs (Akerlof, 1970). For instance, exporters have more 
technical knowledge about French beans quality and safety standards in the export market 
than smallholders. They could source from spot markets but these may not convey exporters’ 
quality preferences very efficiently because of the varied dimensions of quality e.g., size, 
color, texture, smell, timing etc. (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). In such a case, a contract 
would be favorable. Williamson (1979) argues that if the speed of information transfer is slow 
between trading partners e.g., conception in the export market and implementation at the farm 
level, it exposes them to uncertainty and opportunism. Unpredictable changes in producer 
prices and strategic behavior by exporters regarding distortions of market information e.g., 
grade preference etc, expose French beans producers to opportunism if buyers seek rents. 
However, long term relationships based on reputation can reduce opportunism and lead to 
efficient resource allocation (Williamson, 1979). Contracts will be preferred due to 
management of relation specific investments, which loose productive value when redeployed 
(Masten, 1996). Smallholders and exporters invest in relationships that force the 
establishment of infrastructure such as vehicles, packing houses and spray teams, water 
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pumps, grading sheds, toilets, pesticide stores and calibrated knapsacks. Under a contract, the 
relationship creates bilateral dependence where each party can safeguard its investments by 
mutually agreeing to honor future contracts (Williamson, 2000). Contracts are also viewed as 
some form of market inter-linkage overcoming capital market failure where the contracted 
crop acts as collateral (Masakure and Henson, 2005). Due to thin markets for credit provision, 
a contract can be used to supply crop-linked credit finance at the same time linking producers 
to the market, for instance. 
Information asymmetry on quality and safe produce, the need to safeguard specific assets and 
correct market idiosyncrasies in horticulture farming might therefore generate interest in 
contracts. The aim would be to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the 
supply of quality and safe produce in export markets in a compatible risk-sharing arrangement 
and at low transaction costs for the trading partners. Adverse selection means that an exporter 
cannot ascertain if a producer can accurately supply quality and safe beans which results to 
search for producers with ability to supply specified requirements. Moral hazard arises if an 
exporter cannot be sure if a producer has put forth maximal effort to deliver the desired 
requirements. To mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems e.g., cheating on 
quality and market disinformation, supervision or auditing of activities, control of critical 
inputs involved in production, provision of explicit or quality measurement based incentives 
and provision of residual claims might be employed (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hueth et al., 
1999; Giraud et al., 2006) .  
Roy (1972) argues that contracts can be written or oral, explicit or implicit and because of 
unequal bargaining power between partners, contracts may be efficient or exploitative. 
Contracts have been analyzed using principal-agent and transaction cost frameworks 
assuming that contracts exist as a risk-sharing option but more to minimize transaction costs 
(Allen and Lueck, 1993, 1999). In product quality and safety markets, buyers have more 
knowledge about the market. A buyer, referred to as the principal is assumed to be risk-
neutral. He offers contracts that match his preferred criterion e.g., ability to understand quality 
issues etc. Producers choose contracts on a take-it-or-leave- it basis. The producer, referred to 
as the agent, is assumed to be risk-averse. We assume that the contracts offered maximize the 
combined principal’s and agent’s welfare which eliminates pre-contractual costs e.g., 
bargaining (Stiglitz, 1974). Because of an alternative less quality discerning market for 
French beans, a producer can choose either an oral contract for that market or a written 
contract for the high quality markets. Monitoring for oral contracts is self-driven while written 
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contracts are closely monitored (Jaffee, 2003).  Because oral contracts are not subject to a 
hold-up situation, smallholders have the leeway to sell to competitors and subject the 
relationship to shorter trading contracts (Cheung, 1969). Written contracts receive a minimum 
price for produce deliveries to hold them and to reward high quality. This relationship can 
persist longer due to the incentives inherent in the arrangement (Crocker and Masten, 1988). 
We argue that no production for export or alternative market can occur without an oral or 
written contract.  
Assume a risk-averse farmer wishing to produce export beans faces an offer of two contracts; 
written and oral from a risk-neutral buyer. Under each contract a producer’s output can be 
represented as   eq where e  is the unobservable effort of the farmer, and  is a random 
variable with mean 0  and variance
2 . Written contracts yield high quality, Hq and oral 
contracts low quality, 
Lq  differentiable due to the monitoring aspect which allows a buyer to 
enforce quality and safety standards beyond the minimum quality standard (MQS) set in the 
conventional markets, 
q . The producer chooses either of the contracts depending on whether 
they want to be closely monitored or not or whether they desire to produce for high end or the 
alternative market. Mathematically, a written contract is chosen if 
 qqH and an oral 
contract if 
 qqL . The farmer’s problem is to maximize his expected utility, by choosing his 
optimal effort level given the terms of the contract (Allen and Lueck, 1999). This form of 
contracting incorporates risk-averse preferences in the farmer’s maximizing model so as to 
assert more effort in meeting product quality and safety (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). Due to 
uncertainty and unobservable effort, there is moral hazard in every contract for which the 
farmer’s quality level falls below MQS, q  because minimum expected quality is not 
fulfilled. This is important because of the heterogeneous nature of producers’ risk-aversion, 
productivity, cost of effort and reservation utility (Huffman and Just, 2004). Further, the risk-
neutral buyer might offer incentives such as a fixed price, fixed quantity requirements or both 
or provide inputs in which case a farmer’s revenue uncertainty and costs are minimized. As a 
profit maximizing agent, whenever the expected profit of one of the two contracts is higher 
than the expected profit without contracting, a rational farmer is expected to agree with the 
contract offered.  
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Expected effect of explanatory variables on contract choice 
Allen and Lueck, (1999), Prendergast (2002), Huffman and Just (2004) and Fukunaga and 
Huffman (2009) have used theoretical postulations that a contract will be less of a risk-sharing 
and more of a transaction cost minimizing option. They argue that in developed countries, 
choice of crop share or cash-rental contract is influenced by the characteristics of the tenant 
and the landlord and surrounding factors related to the land which is the contractual 
consideration. For a developing country, we argue that in the marketing of quality and safe 
beans, farmer and buyer characteristics and the market environment in which they operate 
will affect the type of contract chosen. In the principal-agent relationship if the farmer is more 
risk-averse chances of being monitored increase otherwise they choose to be independent 
producing the minimum quality for alternative markets. As the farm size under French beans 
increases which is likely to signal increased wealth and less risk aversion, the contract is more 
likely to be oral. Producers with large farm sizes would want the freedom of making decisions 
about their production plans. Large farms will depend more on hired labor than small farms 
which increases the problem of observing quality and safety compared to use of family labor 
in small farms (Jaffee, 2003). Large farms would therefore produce for the MQS market. 
H1: As the farm sizes increase, the chance of choosing a written contract decreases. 
Education increases a producer’s knowledge and decision making skills that could be relevant 
in agronomic practices and market knowledge. Education reduces a producer’s risk-
averseness meaning that more educated producers will not need to be monitored in their 
farming activities choosing to sell in the alternative markets. 
H2: With more education, the likelihood of choosing a written contract decreases 
Lack of product quality and safety information e.g., poor understanding of proper use and 
application of pesticides might require that risk-averse producers be empowered through 
training. Producers lacking in this knowledge would most likely choose written contracts that 
offer the opportunity to be monitored. These are most likely new entrants in the market and 
would prefer increased farm visits. 
H3: An increase in on-farm visits increases the likelihood of choosing a written contract. 
Distribution costs increase with the location of farms from the central collection point. The 
buyer is also aware that monitoring costs increase with increased distances from basic 
infrastructure. A buyer will choose to operate more closely with farmers that are near good 
roads or near the collection point to minimize transport and crop assembly costs. But this 
exposes a buyer to intense competition from other buyers. A rational buyer might choose 
monitored contracts in villages with more collective organizations to reduce crop assembly 
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costs. Organized groups can meet quality and safety requirements more easily and minimize 
monitoring costs because of self-group monitoring system.   
H4: Increased number of collective organizations in a village increases the likelihood of 
using written contracts.  
Producer prices are used as incentives in the procurement of farm supplies. High quality 
produce is more likely to fetch higher prices above the minimum quality that unmonitored 
low quality producers aim for. Therefore, higher producer prices are more likely with written 
contracts than oral contracts that depend on open market transactions. 
H5: An increase in producer prices is likely to influence choice of written contracts 
The characteristics of the buyer-producer relationship have an influence on the type of 
contract offered. Goodhue et al., (2004) and Fraser, (2005) have found duration of contract 
with a buyer to have significant influence on the choice of written contracts. Producers that 
have had a long trading relationship with a buyer are more likely to be involved in written 
contracts to preserve the value of assets that may have been accumulated. There is also the 
need to avoid switching costs e.g., lost market linkage and reputation, which may be 
prohibitive. 
H6: A long producer-buyer relationship increases the likelihood of written contracts. 
The market size will influence the type of contracts offered. French beans are perishable 
which make timely market access critical. In villages with many independent producers 
chances of a loosely developed market hub where buyers can buy produce with less 
transaction costs exist. This reduces the risk-averseness of producers and hence the likelihood 
of oral contracts. Buyers would not be able to monitor and control flow of quality produce 
from many producers in such markets and would most likely offer oral contracts.  
H7: An increased number of sellers in the village and number sharing the same buyer reduce 
the likelihood of written contracts. 
2.2 A model of contract renewals in French beans marketing 
Contract duration analysis in agriculture is scarce. Cheung (1969) postulates that contract 
duration is critical in contract design by arguing that contract length results from the cost of 
transferring land-assets from tenant to landowner. If the cost is too high, longer contracts are 
preferred otherwise, shorter. Allen and Lueck (1992) argue that contract length depends on 
mutual information about the reputation of the contractees, existence of contract specific 
assets and the cost of contract renewal and complex contingent contracts to address changing 
market conditions. The length of contract variable is used as an independent predictor in the 
choice of contract in some agricultural studies e.g., Goodhue et al., (2004), and Fraser, (2005) 
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where the duration of contract with a buyer has significant influence on the choice of written 
and oral contracts. Contract duration has received much attention in coal (Joskow, 1987), 
natural gas (Crocker and Masten, 1988) and franchise (Vásquez, 2007) contracts. Contract 
duration is longer the larger the expected quasi rents and profits and shorter with more 
uncertainty and a larger distortion of incentive provisions (Crocker and Masten, 1988). 
Vásquez (2007) finds that the experience of a franchisee and quasi rents generated by 
investments attracts more contract duration while potential free-riding problem reduces the 
length of contract. Joskow (1987) finds that the length of coal contracts increases the more 
relation-specific the assets are. These studies use OLS, 2SLS and Logistic estimations due to 
the straight forward interpretation of the results. We use a count model to estimate the 
frequency of contract renewals in fresh produce markets to capture the lower bound zero 
renewals which violates linearity assumptions.  
Bogetoft and Olesen (2003) identify coordination of business relationship, behaviour and 
performance motivation and minimization of transaction costs as the key objectives of a 
contract. In the case of French beans production, coordination is the primary purpose of 
adopting a contract because beans are highly perishable and requires synchronized harvesting 
and immediate collection. The number of seasons a producer and a buyer have traded will 
signal stability of a contractual relationship in the marketing of beans. That is, did the contract 
coordinate flow of quality and safe supplies between producers and buyers? Did it motivate 
performance and reduce transactions costs? The stability of contracts may be influenced by 
internal and external factors to the relationship. The main internal considerations are the 
satisfaction gained over the seasons e.g., product quality, risk reduction, price etc, and trust, 
while external factors include switching costs and competition. For instance, a buyer who has 
consistently been supplied with high quality beans is more likely to renew a trading 
relationship than one who has had poor quality. On the other hand, a producer will be satisfied 
with a contract if the price received over the seasons were above competition. Trust between 
trading partners increases the chance of trading for another season and enhances 
communication and performance of tasks. A business relationship with more trust between 
partners will be more stable and longer.  
Fresh market trade relationships will also be renewable for longer if the switching costs from 
one partner to another are prohibitive in the short run to affect farming. The frequency of 
contract renewals might increase to minimize switching costs (Monteverde and Teece, 1982). 
For instance, if it would involve repaying input credit at short notice then producers would be 
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bound until repayment maturity. Buyers would also want to avoid loss of supplies that have 
been committed to certain supply chains to protect future business. Competition for supplies 
is an important reason for a trading relationship to be renewed many times. Because of 
changing market environments, partners might wish to trade closely and longer to weather 
farm and firm competition for supplies. This can be pursued to maintain market position for 
the buyer and trading status for the producer. Changing buyers or producers every season can 
potentially erode the reputation of partners and lead to loss of contracts due to imputed 
unreliability. A farmer will accept to remain in one contract for another season to secure 
income, market access and safeguard the trade exchange for future market dealings. On their 
hand, traders will renew relations if quality and safety requirements have been met and if they 
keep competition checked. Factors that can potentially hold smallholder-buyer relationships 
for more than one season will generally be carried over from a contract’s objectives 
(Masakure and Henson, 2005).  
Factors likely to affect the frequency of contract renewals 
Satisfaction with a trading relationship may be in terms of producer prices and market access 
for the producer, and reduction of trading risks and supplies of quality and safe beans for the 
buyer. These factors reinforce each other. For instance, if the producer price cushions a 
producer through the trading period, it motivates production of quality and safe beans that 
satisfies a trader through reduction of trading risks such as low quality and safe supplies 
which allows producers to gain market access. However, the predictability and the timing of 
the producer price define whether producers put maximal effort in achieving quality and safe 
produce. The more predictable and timely the produce price, the more the satisfaction for 
producers and buyers and more the frequency of contract renewal. 
H1: A producer price that is both predictable and timely will enhance more contract 
renewals. 
More seasons in a contractual relationship will be guided by the ability of producers to 
consistently supply quality and safe produce. One way is to invest in horticultural equipment 
and the other is to be near the source of irrigation water. The number of trading seasons may 
change a producer’s wealth of investments but not the distance to the source of water. The 
uniqueness of horticulture is how timely farms can be irrigated to achieve the desired quality. 
Farms further from sources of irrigation water can have occasional lack leading to crop failure 
through water stress. Compared to producers farming further from water sources, nearness to 
irrigation water would more likely attract more frequent contract seasons with a buyer.  
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H2: An increased distance from the source of irrigation water is negatively related with more 
frequent contract renewals.  
Switching costs are another reason why a contract might last for more seasons. If changing 
buyers/producers results in loss of market share, market access and reputation, then partners 
will stay in the relationship. This yields contracts of longer seasons. The switch may also 
involve sunk costs in equipment and structures. In fresh produce markets, loss of a supplier 
might cause hold-up of capital investments for an exporter and loss of markets in the upstream 
end of the supply chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004). Therefore partners are forced to adjust 
within the arrangement and to fit. Switching costs will vary with the type of buyer and the 
size of the farmer. Exporters have more switching costs and the larger the farm size, the more 
the switching costs. 
H3: An exporter and a large farm size will be positively related with more contract renewals.  
The behavior of buyers and producers and marketing practices will have a negative or positive 
effect on the frequency of contract renewals. As a basic foundation in the learning process, 
experience determines understanding of fresh produce market cycles and how to handle 
buyers’ demand on product specifications. Experienced producers search for stable market 
relations that promise continuity in their market exploits while buyers tend to trust 
experienced producers because of familiarity in trading. New entrants are liable to making 
trial and error kind of business decisions because of limited knowledge of the market and 
market practices. Marketing practices that enhance repeated sales and purchases will define 
how frequent contracts are renewed. Use of sales receipting is one practice that can be used to 
record past market relationships, signifying that trade has been concluded with the mutual 
agreement of both partners.  
H4: Experience and sales receipting are positively related with more contract renewals. 
A more competitive market requires buyers to guard their market shares and their competitive 
domain. A market with numerous buyers in a given area will most likely generate unfair 
competitive practices such as poaching suppliers or cheating on grades, for instance. Buyers 
can relate less frequently with producers in those regions because of unpredictable market 
movements. On the other hand, in regions with more sellers, a buyer can move to consolidate 
his position by locking out competition in terms of consistently renewing contracts with 
producers. Producers seek established market access to guarantee future incomes. If producers 
are assured of market access they can stick to a relationship for more seasons to minimize 
opportunism. It is common for buyers to delay collection of beans to pay lower prices, or to 
reject crops without explained reasons. 
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H5: Villages with more buyers are related with fewer contract renewals while villages with 
many sellers are related with more renewals. 
The frequency of contract renewals might also be subject to trust between the two partners. 
Trust has the potential to reduce transaction costs by avoiding costly negotiations and 
contracting (Dyer, 1996). Trust can be simplified as acting without undue pressure to fulfill 
some role that may not be observed immediately by a partner. Coordination of on- and off-
farm produce handling is critical in maintaining quality and safety in the supply chain. A 
relationship that is built on transparency and accountability in food chains is termed due 
diligent in its responsibility for food quality and safety. Traceability allows producers and 
buyers to converge in terms of tracking the source of quality and safety failure and to correct 
the situation before it runs out of hand. A good traceability system coordinates flow of 
produce, information sharing and reduces distribution inefficiencies. A traceability system 
that can trace the origin of a product is termed effective and efficient. We use a proxy variable 
where beans can be traced using the name of the producer, the farm, the produce collection 
date and whether it originates from an individual farm or organized producer and term it 
complete and full at the farm level. It is expected that as coordination becomes more explicit, 
i.e., fully traceable, the more likely that the frequency of contract renewals will increase as a 
sign of openness. 
H6: A full traceability system will be positively related with more frequent contract renewals. 
3 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
3.1. Choice of farm gate contracts  
A farmer’s choice problem can be analyzed using discrete choice model for contract decisions 
(Masten and Saussier, 2000). Contract choice is an unobservable variable ijY for contract type, 
hypothesized to have the following economic relationship: 
ijjiij zyxY  

 
where ix denotes a vector of farmer si' attributes; iy  denotes a vector of buyer sj'  attributes; 
and ijz denotes the vector of market conditions plus approximation error, which is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of 1. The observed dependent 
variable is, 




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and the likelihood for choice takes 1 for a written contract and 0 for oral thus:  
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where ()F follows a cumulative normal distribution function giving the probability of a 
written contract being chosen, conditional on covariates. The coefficients ,   , and  can 
be estimated using the probit model (Greene, 2000). An increase of an explanatory variable 
with a positive sign raises the probability that a written contract is chosen. 
(i) Methodology: Choice of farm gate contracts  
Here we use a probit model to explain the choice of a written contract. The estimated model 
is: 
ATGFNX 6543210
wY     
where WY represents a written contract=1 and 0, otherwise, X ,farm-farmer factors (e.g., farm 
size, education), N , market attributes (e.g., number of sellers), F , buyer characteristic (e.g., 
extension service), G , collective organizations (e.g., number of producer groups), T , 
producer-buyer length of relationship and A , financial incentives (e.g., price). To improve the 
focus of the key variables discussed we have included a few other variables such as age, on-
farm equipment,  type of buyer and location of farms. 
3.2. Number of contract renewals  
Assume that producers and buyers have been in the observed contract before the survey date. 
Following Masten and Saussier (2000), the decision to renew a contract for another season 
with a buyer can be modelled as duration of contract. Mathematically, this is represented as 
follows 
  XZ 10
*  
where, 
*Z is the duration which lies strictly between 0 and T number of seasons in a contract, 
and X  is a vector of attributes that are likely to affect the efficiency of contracting and the 
longer predicted duration;   is the stochastic term. The natural lower bound of zero in 
contract durations affects the distribution of the error term and its parameterization making 
OLS inappropriate compared to maximum likelihood and count models in solving the 
problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). We assume the dependent variable 
*Z is a log-
normally distributed random variable with probability distribution function 
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(ii) Methodology: Determinants of the frequency of contract renewals 
As in Goodhue et al., (2004), a behavioral model relating contractual renewals is specified. 
The dependent variable has 78 producers with zero seasons indicating lack of past renewals 
with the buyer at the time of the survey. A consistent estimation should take the lower bound 
of zero into account. Zero observations violate linearity assumptions resulting into biased and 
inconsistent estimates. It should also account for over-dispersion since the conditional mean is 
less than the conditional variance. We estimate a negative binomial model as follows 
  XD 10log    
where D  denotes the number of seasons with a buyer before the survey date,  s are the 
regression coefficients to be estimated; X is a vector of explanatory variables that proxy for 
satisfaction, trust, switching costs and competition. These are identified in the hypotheses. As 
in the choice model, we have added some variables to sharpen our focus variables in the 
hypothesis.   
4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data come from a survey of French beans producers in Mwea Tebere of Kirinyaga 
district. The sample consists of 249 producers, selected from a random sample of 24 villages 
conditional on an expected beans harvest in June 2006 and interviewed between April-June 
2006. Interviews involved a wide range of marketing practices using a short questionnaire. 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the choice of contractual form 
and renewal frequency models.  The P-values show significant differences at 5% level for 
most variables. Oral contracts seem much more popular, with more than twice the number 
that uses written contracts. This has the potential to promote personalized open market 
systems. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics by type of contractual form  
 Oral (N=171) Written (N=78)   
Variable  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-test P-value 
Farmer characteristics       
Age (yrs)  40.95 8.63 42.89 9.65 -1.58 .115 
Farming experience (yrs) 13.52 7.25 12.04 6.86 1.52 .130 
Seasons with buyer (3/yr count) 2.82 2.84 8.56 4.69 -11.89 .000 
Rice grower (0,1) .65 .48 .75 .44 -1.57 .118 
Farm characteristics       
Farm size (acres) .88 .57 1.28 .85 -4.35 .000 
Pump ownership (0,1) .86 .34 .96 .19 -2.35 .019 
Protective gear ownership (1,0) .28 .45 .67 .47 -6.35 .000 
Farm-village distance (m) 958.24 1171.33 1132.28 1045.98 -1.12 .262 
Farm-water distance (m) 264.24 192.06 323.80 233.14 -2.12 .035 
Market-buyer characteristics       
Exporter-linked-market (0,1) .39 .49 .78 .41 -6.25 .000 
Exchange buyer driven (0,1) .26 .44 .34 .47 -1.35 .188 
Price given by buyer (0,1) .21 .40 .44 .50 -3.98 .000 
Sales receipted (0,1) .33 .47 .99 .11 -12.23 .000 
No. sellers in village 21.18 7.20 16 5.44 5.66 .000 
No. buyers in village 8.82 2.73 9.19 2.25 -1.04 .301 
Collective organizations       
Group membership (0,1) .17 .38 .90 .30 -15.04 .000 
Group size (count) 5.12 11.29 15.46 5.75 -7.66 .000 
No. groups in village 2.63 2.02 2.66 1.92 -.11 .916 
No. sellers to same buyer 3.41 1.69 3.65 1.27 -1.12 .265 
Traceability of farm produce       
Traceability (stages/count) 1.89 1.38 3.11 .76 -7.32 .000 
Financial(non)incentives       
Price, 3kg carton (KE) 66.16 23.74 76.68 16.66 -8.71 .000 
Price known at planting (0,1) .14 .34 .72 .45 -11.31 .000 
Price fixed/week (0,1) .13 .34 .11 .32 .34 .732 
Spot cash payments (0,1) .48 .50 .03 .16 7.82 .000 
Credit access (0,1) .74 .44 .97 .16 -4.67 .000 
Farm visit  extension (0,1) .36 .48 .97 .16 -11.09 .000 
Regional differences       
Upper Mwea region (0,1) .36 .48 .29 .45 1.14 .256 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006. 
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Farmer characteristics 
Producers using written contracts have about 9 seasons in a trading exchange, which is 
approximately 3 times more than those using verbal contracts. Compared with oral contracts, 
written contracts seem to be a more stable market arrangement. 
Farm characteristics 
Producers with written contracts have large farm sizes under French beans, are further from 
residential villages and source of irrigation water than their counterparts in oral contracts. The 
farm sizes are within national averages of 1.0 acre though land rents are popular because of 
National Irrigation Board’s (NIB) tenancy agreements that limit non-rice related farm 
sizes(Kabutha and Mutero, 2000).  Small farms are easily manageable using family and 
limited hired labour especially in observing crop hygiene and handling practices. The 
ownership of an irrigation water pump is widely spread in both contracts but higher among 
those with written contracts. Though restricted in NIB’s water canals farmers do pump water 
at an unofficial fee (Kabutha and Mutero, 2000). Hiring equipment at a fee or in exchange for 
labour is also common. In lower Mwea, water pumps may not be very vital because producers 
near water canals simply use flooding to irrigate farms. Ownership of protective garments 
essential for pesticides application, certification, personal and crop hygiene is more 
pronounced among those with written contracts. It is a requirement for producers to have a 
regularly calibrated sprayer to minimize overdosing crops and to observe pre-harvest spraying 
interval because of pesticide residue limits regulations. The majority without protective 
garments are in oral contracts. This group perhaps uses the services of spray teams from a 
contracting firm or for finding protective garments expensive, use own clothes. This may 
predispose them to skin and respiratory ailments (Okello and Swinton, 2010). These 
investments may be regarded as strong specific assets in horticulture (Williamson, 1979; 
Wang, 1999).  
Market-buyer characteristics 
The data shows that sales receipting, and price communication by the buyer dominates 
market-buyer characteristics for those in written contracts. These market practices promote 
good business relations and have the potential to enhance trust. Producers with oral contracts 
dominate in villages, which literary shows how personalized interactions shape contractual 
arrangements.  
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Collective organizations 
Ninety percent of organized producers have written contracts while producer groups with 
written contracts are 3 times larger than those with oral contracts. Organized production is 
effective when implementing on-farm quality systems, minimizes oversight, and monitoring 
costs, and is a reliable and consistent source of supplies.  
Traceability of farm produce 
On full produce traceability producers in written contracts have at least 3 identification tags 
on their produce packaging materials compared to about two for those in oral contracts. It is 
therefore possible to identify a producer’s crop in the immediate market chain by at least a 
combination of the identification elements e.g., own name and farm plot etc., In written 
contracts, smallholders’ traceability schemes are designed more on breadth (the amount of 
information the traceability records) than depth (how far back e.g., farm) and precision 
(tracking unit e.g., delivery date) (Golan et al., 2004). The varied trace-back units could point 
to a case of low trust between buyers and sellers, which result to different traceability 
practices (Charlier and Valceschini, 2008). 
Incentives 
Knowledge of expected prices at the onset of planting, extension services and credit access 
are used more in written contracts than in oral contracts. Extension has a role in the diffusion 
of technical and agronomic skills. These incentives, related more with financially capable 
exporters than intermediaries, reduce production uncertainty, quality and safety risks and 
support basic farm investments. The finding indicates a substantive shift toward forward 
pricing. Not surprising, spot cash payments are more of a dominant characteristic in oral 
contracts because of prevalent open market relations. Lagged payments for produce deliveries 
will tend to hold-up producers and could perhaps act as a residual claimancy strategy by 
buyers (Hueth et al., 1999).  Producers in written contracts have a higher average price per 3 
kg carton of French beans than those in oral contracts suggesting that price is a key incentive 
in written contracts.  
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Choice of contract 
The results of the choice of contracts by smallholder French beans producers are reported in 
Table 4.2. The model predicts 93% of the classifications. The linktest indicates that the model 
is correctly specified. The Wald chi-square shows the overall model is significant. 
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Table 4.2: Factors determining use of contracts by smallholders, 2006 
 
Independent variables  
 
Coefficient 
 
SE 
Marginal 
Effects 
 
p-value 
Log farm size under French beans -.420 .277 -.049 0.103 
Post primary school level (0, 1) .696* .409 .082 0.108 
Post secondary school level (0, 2) -.249 .333 -.029 0.445 
Number of farm visits in the season .093* .055 .011 0.064 
Number of producer groups in the village .127 .095 .015 0.166 
Number of farmers in a group .053*** .020 .006 0.003 
Log average price, 3kg/carton -2.136** 1.012 -.251 0.013 
Number of contract seasons with buyer .284*** .074 .033 0.000 
Number of sellers in the village -.142*** .025 -.017 0.000 
Number of farmers sharing same buyer -.109 .113 -.013 0.342 
Control variables     
Age  -.201** .086 -.024 0.026 
Age2 .002** .001 .000 0.017 
Experience in horticulture farming .007 .025 .001 0.773 
Ownership of water pump (0, 1) 1.526*** .538 .180 0.001 
Ownership of protective gear (0, 1) .661 .439 .078 0.144 
Linkage to market by exporter (0,1) .211 .532 .025 0.697 
Farm region of upper Mwea (0,1) -.893*** .311 -.105 0.004 
Constant  11.5*** 4.38   
Wald chi2 (df) 101.3 (17)   
Log pseudolikelihood -51.75    
Correct classifications 93%    
Linktest  .088 .066  .179 
Number of observations 249    
*, ** and *** denote 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively   
Education level 
The hypothesis on education and use of written contracts shows support for post-primary 
educated producers at 10% level. This group relies on agriculture for livelihood and might be 
very risk-averse to markets that threaten the stability of their incomes. Perhaps due to low 
skills and few off-farm employment opportunities, these producers find limited decision 
making environment embedded in written contracts appropriate in their farming and 
marketing exploits. 
On-farm visits 
There is a positive likelihood of written contracts with increased number of on-farm extension 
visits signifying a closely monitored relationship. Extension reduces information asymmetry 
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on product quality and safety in the market chain by passing on technical advice. Extension 
has the potential to minimize risks of pesticide contaminants in water sources, post harvest 
produce and affecting the applicator for instance. This is relevant in environmental, maximum 
residue limits and personal welfare concerns. Due to arising monitoring costs, a more efficient 
contract would be more written than oral.  
Collective organizations 
The results show that a producer group’s size positively influences use of written contracts. 
The marginal effects are less than 1%. There is cooperative strength in organized numbers 
because of social cohesion and networking, which translate into marketing order and chances 
for low per unit production costs, and negotiation power for marketed produce (see 
Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). Because of accumulated marketing and market access 
capabilities, there would be a tendency to seek a more assuring and reliable market 
relationship that can cushion their administrative and investment costs.  
Producer price 
Contrary to expectation, higher French beans prices have negative significant marginal effects 
of 25% in the choice of a written contract. This seems to be a competitive tool in a market 
environment dominated by numerous independent producers and competing buyers. Though 
export markets compete on quality and safety, farm gate buyers use price incentives to induce 
side-selling and to secure supplies from non-contracted smallholders. The results suggest that 
the benefits of assured market access in written contracts override price incentives.  
 Producer-buyer length of relationship 
Producers with more number of contract seasons with a buyer are likely to use written 
contracts. An extra season increases the likelihood of a written contract by 3.3%. This 
indicates that producers who commit to consistent yearly production seek for reliable market 
arrangements that might cover risks of adverse market fluctuations. A longer relationship 
could also be an unnecessary hold-up because producers tend to rely on buyers for soft loans 
or cash advances.   
Number of sellers in a village and sharing of buyer 
An increased number of producers in a given village reduces the likelihood of using a written 
for oral contracts by 1.7%. This is expected in a commonly shared environment. Because 
producers will tend to informally share true and false information about the functioning of a 
market, producers are likely collude to renege on strict terms and conditions of a written 
contract. Additionally, because of the homogeneity of French beans buyers are aware of 
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shared opportunism and desire to collude to market non-contracted output through contract 
producers. This result is an indication that holding parties in a tightly controlled production 
structure is likely to be beset with contractual failure in highly concentrated production 
regions. In a rural monetised and semi-commercial agricultural economy, buyers face high 
transactions costs because of marketing malpractices such as side-selling of contracted 
produce, monitoring and oversight costs (McCulloch and Ota, 2002). Thus oral contracts 
could more likely be a solution to such marketing failure. 
5.2 Determinants of contractual renewals  
The likelihood ratio chi-square test (chibar2 (01) =79.37) rejects the null hypothesis that the 
dispersion parameter alpha is equal to zero at 5% level.  This suggests that the frequency of 
contract renewals is over-dispersed and is not sufficiently described by the simpler Poisson 
distribution. Table 4.3 shows the negative binomial coefficients. Most of the variables have 
significant relationship with the frequency of contract renewals at between 1% and 10% level.  
Table 4.3: Determinants of contract renewals 
 Negative Binomial Estimates 
Independent variables Coefficient SE IRR SE 
Log average price, 3kg/carton -.255 .561 .775 .435 
Price known at planting (0,1) .216* .118 1.241* .147 
Spot cash payments (0,1) .781** .367 2.184** .801 
Log farm-irrigation water distance (m) .156* .092 1.169* .108 
Log farm under beans (acre) .320*** .096 1.377*** .133 
Producer-export firm link (0,1) .529*** .159 1.697*** .270 
Log farming experience (years) .085 .103 1.089 .112 
Sales receipted (0,1) .782** .391 2.186** .855 
Log sellers in the village .061 .070 1.063 .075 
Log buyers in the village -.364* .217 .695* .151 
Traceability level (count) .171** .085 1.186** .101 
Control variables      
Supply contract written (0,1) .419* .228 1.520* .347 
Farm region upper Mwea (0,1) -.299** .148 .742** .110 
Constant  .623 2.622 1.865 4.890 
/lnalpha -1.042 .296   
alpha .353 .105   
Wald chi2(df) 202.9 (13)   
Log pseudolikelihood  579.17    
LR test chibar2 (01)  79.37***    
Number of observations 249    
*, **, *** denote the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively   
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The coefficients for numeric predictors are interpreted as follows: for a one unit 
increase/decrease, the expected log count of the frequency of contract renewal 
increase/decrease by the regression coefficient. The dummy variables are interpreted as the 
expected difference in log count from the reference category. The results can also be 
interpreted as incidence rate ratios. Numeric estimates are interpreted thus: 
increasing/decreasing the independent variable by one unit leads to an increase/decrease in the 
incidence rate of the frequency of contract renewals by a factor equivalent to the variable’s 
coefficient less than 1. For example, increasing the level of traceability by one trace-back unit 
increases the rate for the frequency of contract renewals by a factor of 0.19. For dummy 
variables, the independent variable will have a rate equivalent to its regression coefficient 
times the incidence rate for the reference category. For instance, exporters have an incidence 
rate of 0.38 times the incidence rate of frequency of contract renewal for intermediaries. 
Producer price: predictability and timing 
If price expectations are known at planting compared to harvesting, producers have 0.22 times 
higher expected log counts of contract renewals. Supply and demand imbalances, plus cut 
throat competition for supplies aggravate side-selling, low prices and loss of postharvest 
through ad hoc grading standards and quality demands during harvesting time. Producers in 
such arrangements would not sustain repeated renewals with the buyer for longer. On the 
other hand, future prices enable producers to plan production e.g., acreage, inputs acquisition 
etc., and can hold-up producers in a trading relationship for subsequent seasons. Sometimes, 
upfront pricing could be a buyer’s strategy to mitigate adverse on-season price competition. 
There are possibilities to latter deliberately under-price postharvest produce during harvesting. 
The difference in the expected log count of contract renewals is 0.78 times higher for spot 
cash payments compared with lagged payments. Spot cash payments motivate sellers to 
consistently deliver beans in subsequent market days because they can immediately compare 
with competitors and also allow producers to offset rather than postpone their financial 
obligations. This result indicates that recurring trade relationships for French beans producers 
are enhanced by the ability of the buyer to make immediate payments. The use of price-
related incentives to hold smallholders into more production and trading seasons point to a 
shift from dependence on traditional incentives of credit and extension services. The role of 
incentives has received attention in Stiglitz (1974) and Bogetoft and Olesen (2003). 
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Farm-irrigation water distance 
The result on farm-irrigation water distance is surprising because it has a positive effect on the 
frequency of contract renewals. An increase of distance by a meter increases the frequency by 
0.16 counts. The possibility is that farms located further from the source of irrigation water 
have low chances to pollute waterways and assuming that producers use environmental 
friendly production practices e.g., proper pesticides disposal etc, repeated contract renewals 
are expected. Firms exporting to UK and EU retail markets are forced to observe 
environmental conservation and care through KenyaGAP/GlobalGAP standards (GlobalGAP, 
2010). Environmental conservation as a quality attribute enhances buyer’s image and 
reputation.  
Type of buyer and farm size 
An export firm has an expected log count of the frequency of contract renewals 0.53 times 
higher than intermediaries. This means that they maintain their relationships with 
smallholders for longer. Besides financial and logistic capabilities over intermediaries in 
maintaining contracts for consistent and reliable supplies, export firms have experience with 
smallholders’ contracting since the late 1990s (Jaffee and Little, 1994). The farm under 
French beans is a positive and significant factor in determining the renewal of contracts. An 
increase in the farm under French beans by 1 acre yields an estimated 0.32 expected log count 
of the frequency of contract renewals. Land has a significant contribution in fresh produce 
markets because a buyer is guaranteed of a source of supplies at low assembling costs. A large 
farm size can support farm investments like a grading shed, traceability and quality 
management systems, and can be used as collateral against agricultural credit. 
Experience and sales receipting 
The issuing a sales receipt to conclude exchange results to frequency of contract renewals of 
0.52 times units compared to non-receipting. Producers build trust in a trading relationship if 
exchanges are recorded for future reference. This has the effect of solidifying trade 
exchanges, motivates repeated sales and purchases and is a fall back strategy in case of 
disagreements.  
Number of sellers and buyers in the village 
In villages with many buyers the frequency of contract renewals is statistically lower by a 
value of 0.36. Engaging producers for longer can wade off stiff competition. But in the 
presence of many buyers, homogeneity and perishable nature of French beans there abound 
unfair business practices as each firm tries to buy supplies from competitors. In this case, 
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buyers might prefer supply and demand dynamics to guide trade relationships which results 
into less frequent contract renewals.   
Traceability of farm produce 
On traceability, there are 0.17 higher expected log counts of the frequency of contract 
renewals for every traceable point added in the system. By consistently subscribing to a strict 
trace-back system, incidences of low quality produce deliveries and incentive to switch buyers 
during the season reduce. This minimizes distribution inefficiencies in the flow of marketed 
beans between a buyer and a producer. More contract renewals might be guaranteed because 
full traceability is evidence of a producers’ willingness for transparent audit of own product 
quality and safety along the supply chain. The built trust between partners enhances more 
frequent contract renewals.  
The control variables show that compared with oral contracts, those with written contracts 
have expected log counts of 0.42 times higher. It is plausible to hold producers into a longer 
exchange relationship for written contracts to benefit from the established monitoring and 
administrative structures. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The push for farm consolidations, private standards certification, traceability and supply 
reliability by Western European supermarkets and retailers might exclude developing 
countries’ smallholders from high value chains for lack of scale economies. However, 
horticultural contracts, written or otherwise have been used to facilitate their co-optation 
despite contractual enforcement problems. We have particularly examined the factors 
influencing the choice to use written contracts by French beans producers and the frequency 
of contract renewal with buyers.  
The study reveals that due to low skills and lack of off-farm employment opportunities, post-
primary educated producers prefer written contracts. This group relies mainly on agricultural 
incomes and thus avoids extreme risk in oral contracts for stable markets. The provision of 
extension services is positively related with written contracts. This result implies that markets 
for export horticulture are susceptible to food quality and safety checks that demand 
knowledgeable producers. By providing extension advice, producers can farm in line with 
environmental and personal welfare requirements. This indicates that search for quality and 
safe products has a monitoring cost element that buyers might have to incorporate in their 
plans when sourcing from smallholders. 
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Collective organizations are deemed crucial in market or production arrangements that 
demand cost reductions or adoption of new innovations (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Our 
results indicate that large producer groups, which mean negotiation power, market 
organization and reduced costs of monitoring product quality and safety in a wide production 
area, positively predict written contracts. This result lends credence to the role of organized 
groups in bringing order in underdeveloped markets (Place et al., 2004). The policy debate 
however is whether producer groups should work under an umbrella producer marketing 
organization or they should operate as single entities in a market for a homogenous product 
like French beans.  
The study demonstrates that the length of relationship between buyers and smallholders has a 
positive effect on the choice of written contracts. This implies that relationships that spun for 
more seasons are well grounded in closely monitored arrangements perhaps to cushion 
producers from adverse effects of price and market changes. 
Higher producer prices motivate choice of oral contracts. The result might indicate that when 
price incentive is strong enough, producers choose marketing arrangements that do not hold-
up their investments. Anecdotal evidence shows that exporters will rarely offer prices above 
competition even to those in written contracts. Therefore, the policy issue would be whether 
prices are realistic incentives in contracting or a strategy to motivate production for future 
supplies. Further, it would be a researchable question to understand whether producers in 
written contracts are really getting lower producer prices than their counter parts in oral 
contracts. The study shows that increased number of sellers in the village predicts oral 
contracts. The result indicates that concentration of village markets generates localized scale 
economies, some sort of bargaining power and possibly very competitive prices. Despite 
higher outputs and low costs of assembling farm produce, possibilities of manipulating 
quality, higher monitoring and oversight costs favour flexible relationships. This means that 
oral contracts might dominate alternative market chains e.g., non-certified and local 
supermarkets that are not strict on quality. The result reveals that where markets are very 
competitive and transaction costs are high, oral contracts perform better than written 
contracts.  
Overall our results indicate that higher prices and high concentration of producers in a village 
found oral arrangements while low education, extension, membership in a large producer 
organization, and a long trading relationship differentiate written contracts. This shows that 
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strategic farm-based contracts might persist in providing smallholders with access to both the 
strict food quality and safety markets and the less strict alternatives markets. 
The results of the negative binomial model reveal that if the price offered to producers is 
predictable and payments properly timed at planting, contract renewals between producers 
and buyers are more frequent. This shows that the role of future prices and a payment 
arrangement that enhances stability of working capital for producers can stabilize trading in 
fresh produce markets. Farms that are further from the source of irrigation water have higher 
frequency of contract renewals with buyers than those that are located closer. Farmers use 
pesticides and fertilizers in their production, which could easily find their way into waterways 
through spraying or washouts. The result indicates that if producers and buyers have strong 
environmental concerns more frequent contract renewals for reputation and image building 
could be realized. The result on farm size indicates that a guaranteed source of supplies, 
ability to support farm investments and quality related infrastructure e.g., a quality 
management system, will generally interpret into more frequent contract renewals with fresh 
produce buyers.  
The study reveals that exporters compared to intermediaries have more frequent contract 
renewals with smallholders. This suggests that financial and logistic capabilities are critical in 
managing relationships with smallholders. It could be that exporters remain a more efficient 
market-linkage for smallholders. Policy wise, it would be economically sensible to initiate 
buyer-supplier market linkages with the involvement of producers in the decision making 
process if the failures of past initiatives are to be avoided (see Ashraf et al., 2009). Further, it 
is logical to ask whether the linkages are sustainable in the long run because some exporters 
are known to exploit high season windfalls and then to exit leaving a whole lot of 
disenfranchised producers (Jaffee, 2003). Concluding sales transactions with documented 
evidence of receipts increases the number of contract renewals with a buyer. This shows that 
when trade conclusion is mutually agreed with referenced information, trust increases and 
yields more frequent contract renewals. 
The study demonstrates that some form of traceability system is essential in increasing the 
frequency of contract renewals. Besides distribution efficiencies, traceability enhances trust 
between buyers and smallholders. The issue with policy would be what could fit smallholder 
producer units and how far back and forward to go. Nevertheless, there are manual systems 
developed by donor-private firms’ partnerships in place, which could be the beginning point 
for trace-back systems (Liaison Committee on Europe Africa Caribbean and Pacific, 2006).  
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The results indicate that competition is negatively related with the frequency of contract 
renewals. Because of the higher number of buyers in villages it is costly to monitor 
smallholders because of market malpractices like side-selling of contracted produce. The 
result means that open market practices in highly competitive regions can only support less 
frequent contract renewals. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Summary and Conclusions 
The European Union (EU) is the main market for Kenya’s French beans. Over 60% of the 
total exports of Kenya’s fruit and vegetables are marketed in the United Kingdom (UK), 
Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium. The markets are heavily regulated either through 
public or private standards on the sale of foodstuffs from the farm to the table. There is 
increased demand by Western food retailers for fresh produce from larger suppliers that can 
document production practices, ensure consistency and reliability. The principal challenge 
however, is how smallholders can comply with GlobalGAP (GGAP) standard because it is 
costly in terms of investment infrastructure, recurrent expenditure on farm audits and 
certification fees. Many food retailers in the EU are members of GGAP and in fact demand 
GGAP certification from their suppliers. This poses potential danger of excluding many 
smallholders from the export market. If adopted, however, GGAP has the potential to spread 
benefits of food quality and safety to local markets, improve the health and welfare of 
producers, protect the environment from hazardous materials and enhance smallholders’ 
market access opportunities.   
 Against this background, this thesis analyses three objectives: 1) What are the determinants 
of a successful GGAP certification? 2) Does GGAP certification have an effect on farm gate 
producer prices? 3) Which factors affect the choice of contractual form and the frequency of 
contract renewal? The thesis answers these three questions by using survey data from 249 
smallholder French beans producers from Kenya. 
In the first essay, the success by smallholder French beans producers to adopt GGAP a key 
private standard in Kenya’s fruit and vegetables markets for the last 6 years is analyzed. 
Smallholders will choose a farm innovation if it has more benefits than what they are using or 
other innovations, otherwise not. This is a binary choice problem that can be analyzed using a 
logit or probit model. A probit model is preferred in deriving likelihood estimates since 
choices made by producers are unknown a priori which allows assumption of normality. The 
results suggest a higher probability of GGAP adoption with more contract seasons with a 
buyer, a larger area under beans, ownership of protective garments, a higher number of 
producer groups and farmers sharing a buyer in a village, a larger producer group and more 
extension visits.  
The results on more contract seasons with a buyer and sharing a buyer indicate some sort of 
network between producers and buyers. Because the initial certification costs are high, they 
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can be amortized at low per unit cost per producer with a large number of producers and it is 
also less costly for a buyer who chooses to assist producers in a cost-sharing arrangement. 
More contract seasons build trust, confidence, consistent supplies base and mutual hold-up, 
which are an efficient framework to support shared investments and certification. Producers 
who break trading relations often may not benefit from collective approach to certification if 
buyers are willing to cost-share. The perishable nature of beans requires consistent buyer-
supplier relations and coordination but more important is costs spread if GGAP is to be 
sustainable among smallholders. The conclusion is that a trusted relationship and critical mass 
can successfully overcome certification barriers for smallholders.  
The results reveal that use of short closely monitored supply chains and more producers in a 
village lower success of GGAP adoption. As hypothesized, if buyers find quality and safety of 
produce from closely monitored supply chains sufficient to serve alternative markets, they are 
not motivated to have them certified. Producers under monitored production contracts have 
access to private extension services from a buyer’s agronomist so quality and safety is strictly 
observed. This result might mean that either those using short closely monitored supply 
chains serve alternative markets or though willing to get certification did not succeed. The 
latter might happen when producers do not fulfill some compliance control points as 
stipulated in the certification process. On the number of producers in a village, it would be 
expected that given the opportunity to enter certified markets, smallholders could easily form 
producer groups to necessitate certification. However, this is not surprising because 
independent producers might lack a common platform to assess the benefits and costs of 
certification. In a disjointed decision making environment, it is unlikely to seek certification. 
Further, if producers do not engage in production throughout the year then amassing group 
strength becomes difficult. Villages are also likely to be local market centers for buyers 
targeting alternative markets that do not emphasize on certification. These results might imply 
two things: one, unsuccessful adoption of GGAP by producers in villages and in short closely 
monitored supply chains marginalizes many smallholders from accessing premium quality 
markets and two, alternative markets for non certified produce are well established among 
smallholders. There is need to investigate how smallholders choose whether to be engaged in 
short closely monitored supply chains because these chains seem to promote unsuccessful 
adoption and subsequently deny smallholders access to premium  markets.  
Further results show that the number of producer groups and their sizes, and number of 
producers sharing a buyer in a village matter in successful adoption of GGAP. Producer 
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groups are closer to many farmers compared with individual producers, can amass trust, 
resources and self-monitoring mechanisms in the establishment of a common certification 
platform at low cost. In terms of policy, reliance on producer groups may be a more effective 
way to co-opt smallholders in farm gate private quality and safety standards. Whether 
smallholders’ have proper leadership and management capabilities to foster cohesion and 
sustainability of producer groups needs further research.  
In addition, if a producer owns protective clothing, has access to extension and experience in 
horticulture farming they are likely to succeed in certification. Lack of farm assets constrains 
consistent supply of produce while lack of knowledge on product quality and safety increases 
information costs along the chain which might lead to exclusion from high value chains. It is 
concluded that successful certification is enhanced by producers’ human capacity and access 
to farm assets. Investing in farm assets might require producers to seek financing through 
smallholder based credit schemes that are available in most commercial banks
12
. On 
extension, there are private and public service providers and donor-funded outreach programs 
tailored to educate producers through ‘barazas13’ on pesticides use and application, 
certification and traceability. One would be interested, however to know how costs of buyer 
sanctioned private extension services are appropriated to the final producer price.  
In the second essay the effect of GGAP certification on farm gate producer prices is analyzed. 
Beside market access, the prime concern for producers is whether price premiums are realized 
due to compliance. The econometric model considers producer prices as hedonic, offered 
every market day, to reward the desired quality (e.g., color, size, freshness etc) and other 
factors. A producer who has successfully adopted GGAP gets a price that is assumed to 
reward certification as an assurance of farm level compliance with product quality and safety. 
Therefore, certification is treated as a quality attribute in the analysis. The econometric model 
shows that GGAP certification, the use of supply contracts, direct procurement by exporters, 
and the size of markets in a village, have a positive effect on producer prices. Organized 
producers receive significantly lower prices. The GGAP premium is not very large and is less 
important than supply contracts and direct procurement premiums. Of particular importance is 
                                                 
12
 For example, Equity Bank has an agricultural loan for the purchase of farm inputs and equipment, Cooperative 
Bank has Maziwa loan for dairy producers, Kenya Commercial Bank has Mavuno loan for tea producers and 
Family Bank has Majani Plus for the purchase of farm inputs and equipment. Loans are repaid from final 
product revenues. 
13
 It is a Kiswahili term for a grass-root meeting by government operatives to pass its policies. A permit must be 
granted by the police department for private barazas. Pesticides Initiative Program (PIP) and Safe Use Project 
(SUP) use barazas to sensitize producers on emerging market issues notably pesticides use, traceability and 
certification. 
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that GGAP premiums are not constant over one season. The premium increases towards the 
end of the season which could indicate either graduated increase in the premium or an initial 
low premium to cover certification costs. The interpretation is that unsuccessful certification 
of producers because of high initial costs is a hindrance to produce quality and assurance as 
well as a higher price not necessarily on a market day but spread over the season. This result 
shows that contrary to some literature, it is possible that producers in farm gate QAS are 
getting a premium not too large as perhaps expected by producers. The fact that no 
independent producers have been certified, might indicate the existence of alternative 
marketing channels without requiring investments in a demanding certification process. 
Therefore, further research should center on the question of how a farm governance structure, 
independent or organized production, affects the willingness to apply for GGAP certification.  
More buyers in a given village are found to increase prices paid to producers. The converse, 
which is a decline in the number of buyers in certain regions, may be of great concern for 
local regulators because it may expose smallholders to opportunistic buying behavior. For 
instance, buyers could exploit time specificity and the perishable nature of French beans to 
delay collection, collude, or falsify grading, and later derive quasi-rents by offering low 
prices. Anecdotal evidence shows that small exporters sporadically offer high prices to attract 
produce, and subsequently exploit the log-in effect. Opportunistic practices (i.e., diverting 
contracted produce to competitors, collusion, delayed collection, and falsifying grades etc.) 
have received attention in the literature. Thus, local authorities should be trained to develop 
appropriate capabilities to survey the functioning of markets. Indirectly, antitrust policy on 
local farmers markets can be a contribution to agricultural development. 
Better roads are not found to lead to higher prices in the econometric analysis. One possible 
conclusion is that bureaucratic practices on roads such as horticultural fees and corrupt 
charges in police guarded roadblocks prevent the realization of efficiency gains. Whether this 
is the case cannot be finally answered with the dataset at hand. Therefore, the link between 
institutional quality and the realization of expected efficiency gains due to infrastructure 
improvements requires future research. Finally, marketing practices such as a direct linkage to 
exporters, use of a supply contract, and non-switching selling to one buyer could increase 
producer’s revenues. Informing producers of these findings is a relevant step to realize an 
impact of this analysis.  
The third essay investigates the factors that affect choice of contractual form and the 
frequency of contract renewals. Horticultural contracts can facilitate production and consistent 
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supply of high quality produce, reduction of search costs and co-optation of smallholders into 
high value chains despite contractual enforcement problems. Contracts are a strategy for risk 
management and transaction costs reduction in quality and safety conscious consumer 
markets. An optimal contract without pre-contractual costs is assumed in this analysis. The 
buyer is risk-neutral and can offer either a written contract with a monitoring rider or non 
monitored oral contracts. Risk-averse producers choose the contract that suits their personal 
and market environments under full information. On this basis, it is assumed that the observed 
contracts have a risk-sharing and transaction cost reducing element and analyzed using the 
probit model. The frequency of contract renewal is assumed to be based on a relay production 
method of three-months-three-seasons contract with a buyer every year. To make it tractable, 
the observed number of seasons with a buyer is assumed to be the number of contract 
renewals before the survey date. Because of the lower bound zeros that violate linearity 
assumptions, a negative binomial model is estimated to capture the possibility of over-
dispersion. It is hypothesized that satisfaction with the buyer-producer relationship, trust, 
switching costs and competition determine the frequency of renewals.  
The results indicate that producers with post primary education, more extension visits, and 
contract seasons with a buyer and a higher number of producers in a group differentiate 
written contracts. Due to lack of skills and off-farm employment opportunities, post primary 
educated producers use written contracts in the production of beans. This reveals that a group 
that relies mainly on agricultural incomes is risk-averse preferring stable market relationships. 
Markets for export horticulture are subject to food quality and safety checks that demand 
knowledgeable producers. Extension advice empowers producers with that knowledge. The 
result indicates that search for quality and safe products has a monitoring cost element that 
buyers might have to incorporate in their sourcing plans from smallholders. The number of 
contract seasons suggests that when contacts spun for longer, the need to perhaps cushion 
partners from adverse effects of price, output and market changes motivates a well grounded 
and closely monitored relationship.  
The size of groups gives producers negotiation power, enhance market organization and 
minimize monitoring costs in a wide production area. Buyers would prefer transaction-cost 
reducing organizations in markets that compete on quality. Organized groups might also seek 
contractual forms that help them to cover administrative costs and stabilize markets for their 
high product volumes. This result lends credence to the role of organized groups in bringing 
order in underdeveloped markets. The conclusion is that where markets seek quality and 
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stability written contracts are preferable. The policy debate however is whether producer 
groups are efficient under an umbrella producer marketing organization or as single entities in 
a market for a homogenous product like French beans. 
A higher number of producers in the village and a higher producer price predict choice of oral 
contracts. Critical mass in the number of sellers generates a shared market that is very 
competitive in prices. When producers in a village produce a homogeneous fresh product, 
price fluctuations are very high and unlikely to signal quality beside high monitoring and 
oversight costs. Such a market becomes very risky to transact in with written contracts. Price 
incentive induces performance to farm quality and safe produce. It measures a producer’s 
expected income from farming at the end of the season. Buyers might use price as a “captive” 
clause to deter side-selling of produce to competitors and to establish a common base for 
future supplies. However, sustaining higher prices in markets with numerous independent 
producers is costly. This result implies that when price incentive is strong enough, it may 
motivate producers to prefer open flexible market arrangements. Our results reveal that where 
markets are very competitive and transaction costs are high, oral contracts perform better than 
written contracts. 
On the frequency of contract renewal, the econometric results show an increase if producer 
prices are known at planting time and payments made on the spot, with farm distance to 
irrigation water source, sales receipting and traceability, area under beans and market linkage 
by an export firm but a decrease with the number of competing buyers in a village. 
Predictable prices and timely payments enhance producers’ planning, stability of incomes and 
can stabilize trading in fresh produce markets. The result shows that by enhancing producer 
satisfaction, buyers are able to secure more contract renewals. This result further indicates that 
price incentives play a major role in reducing contractual failure on the part of risk-averse 
partners in fresh produce markets. Farmers located further from irrigation water source have 
more contractual renewals compared to those located nearer. Farms near water sources have a 
higher possibility of contaminating waterways through farm wastes. Environmental 
conservation is a key component of GGAP standard and local environmental regulations by 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA). As key stakeholders, buyers are keen 
to avoid antagonizing government regulations which would most likely be interpreted as the 
cause of observed preference for farms located further from water sources for frequent 
contract renewals. The result shows that if producers and buyers have strong environmental 
concerns frequent contract renewals for reputation and image building, balance arising 
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transaction costs. The results suggest that concerns for transaction costs reductions especially 
switching and searching for suppliers, and price competition motivate more frequent contract 
renewals. The case of reputation and image building is in strong favour for more frequent 
contract renewals for farmers unlikely to compromise the environment.   
Sales conclusions with a receipt increase the frequency of contract renewals with a buyer. A 
receipt documents evidence of past trading relations for future reference. It means that any 
party aggrieved in the course of relating can refer to the receipted information to solve 
differences. Prices and output records are important planning items for successful farm 
business. This result shows that when trade conclusion is mutually agreed with referenced 
information, there is trust, friction in the relationship decreases yielding more contract 
renewals. Full traceability increases the frequency of contract renewals too. Perhaps because 
of distribution efficiencies and trust in the products handled, contract renewals become highly 
possible and easy between partners. Traceability signals acceptance of transparency and 
responsibility over product quality and safety. This strengthens a buyer’s trust with producers. 
The result on receipting and traceability indicate that trust between partners in fresh produce 
markets has the possibility of reducing contractual failure and unnecessary renegotiations. 
Policy wise, consideration should be given to what could fit smallholder units, how far back 
and forward to go though the existing manual systems from donor-private firms’ partnerships 
could form the basis for development.  
The result on farm size indicates that a guaranteed source of supplies, ability to support farm 
investments and quality infrastructure e.g., a quality management system, will generally 
interpret into more contract renewals with fresh produce buyers. Compared to intermediaries, 
export firms engage in more frequent contract renewals, which suggest that financial and 
logistic capabilities are critical in managing contracts. This indicates that exporters remain a 
more efficient market-linkage for smallholders. The result on the number of buyers in a 
village shows that stiff competition makes it difficult to renew contracts more frequently 
because of the inability to depend on an uncertain open market system. Policy wise, initiating 
market linkages with the involvement of producers in the decision making process reduces 
chances of failed initiatives. The sustainability of linkages when some exporters exploit high 
season windfalls and then exit leaving disenfranchised producers needs further probe. 
The study contributes to the growing discourse on QAS in international markets severally. 
There are arguments that business to business standards are segmenting markets at the farm 
level. The study has shown that market partnership, farmer and farm asset capacity and 
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targeted incentives aid smallholders to successfully adopt GGAP certification to access 
premium markets. Conversely, short closely monitored supply chains and independent 
producers reduce successful adoption of GGAP opting to serve alternative less demanding 
markets. Therefore, the debate on market segmentation is clearly not baseless. This finding 
has implications in developing and least developed countries because export crops are 
promoted by a few export firms showing that smallholders markets might be highly 
segmented with increased QAS. 
On the argument that QAS exert extra farm production costs with no observable gains in 
producer prices, this study has shown that although not very large, GGAP certified producers 
have a price premium. GGAP is not visible at the consumer end so producers have no stake 
on the consumer price. However, market participants are passing on price benefits to 
producers in a small way. Finally, this study has shown that farm level contractual forms 
evolve as risk-reduction and transaction cost minimizing options for buyers and producers. 
Contracts are an efficient strategy to order quality and safe supplies from smallholding farms. 
Hence, the study lends support to the use of contracting as a transitional strategy for 
smallholders in developing countries to produce quality commodities for consumer based 
markets. 
Further, the study points to several windows for further research. There is an opportunity to 
extend empirical analysis to other smallholding sub-sectors e.g., cut flowers and fruit 
production. Secondly, the study utilizes a one season cross-sectional data with a very short 
time period to model successful adoption of GGAP certification, its effect on producer prices, 
and choice of contracts and frequency of renewals. This is done under strict assumptions: no 
dis-adoption or renewal of certification, no change of contracts or buyers was considered for 
example. Future research should consider studying long term effects of certification with 
respect to producer group growth and implications for structural change, price volatility, 
stability of market exchange and rejection rates, using a longer panel. Such a study would 
capture certification and contracting as on-going processes, where producers enter or exit. The 
results have also shown that producer prices are influenced by seasonality and buyers. A study 
of price transmission to assess the relationship between producer and exporter prices at 
various times of the season could expose market (in)efficiencies and possible market power 
tendencies in the supply chain. Finally, a value chain analysis for beans might locate 
participants of the supply chain and possibly explain the duality of markets at the farm level.  
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Methodological Appendix 
This section includes methodological issues that are not fully included in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Four. 
Successful GlobalGAP certification and Choice of contractual form 
We are interested 1) in the successful adoption of GlobalGAP (GGAP) certification by 
smallholder French beans producers and 2) in the choice of written contracts in marketing. 
The choice made by a producer manifests some maximized underlying utility. This utility is 
latent meaning it cannot be directly observed. Therefore, the observed choice is utility 
maximizing for that producer. The motives for adopting GGAP are varied: costs reduction, 
quality, profits and reputation. Some producers may, others may not be successful in adopting 
GGAP because of financial and technical constraints. On the other hand, the benefits of using 
a written contract are diverse: an assured buyer, price risk reduction, quality and access to 
incentives where available e.g., credit. In both strategies, buyers are assured high quality and 
safe supplies, minimized transaction costs of searching for sellers, and reliability. Under 
increased farm production costs from certification, we assume that resource constrained 
French beans producers would pursue price/profit/revenue motive more succinctly (Hobbs, 
2003). This applies to contracts too. As profit maximizing agents, producers will evaluate 
each choice given its probability level  P  from a finite set of alternatives in a certain choice 
set, nC . In our case, producers have a binary choice problem: either successfully adopt, 
GGAP or not, OR choose a written or oral contract. If the latent profit associated with GGAP 
(or written contract), i  is greater than the probabilities associated with profits from non-
certification (oral contracts), then a producer adopts GGAP (or uses a written contract) thus:  
iii X   , 
 
 00
01 


ii
ii
y
y


 1 
where i is the latent profit, i
X is a vector of explanatory variables, iy  is the successful 
adoption of GGAP (or use of written contract) and i is a random error capturing unobserved 
attributes. This choice will be heterogeneous across a given population of smallholder 
producers because of socio-economic characteristics. Some producers will have successfully 
adopted GGAP (or used written contracts) because of better placement in terms of resources 
and access to incentives. Since the utility is latent, we can only use observable factors e.g., 
producer experience, to explain the observed adoption or use. The latent profit i is assumed 
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to be a linear function of the explanatory variables iX and the unobservable error variable i
in the form  
iii X    2 
Because the latent profit is not directly observable the use of Ordinary Least Squares 
regression of  on X  is unreliable and produces biased estimates. The probability of the 
latent profit being observed is represented as follows 
    )Pr()0Pr(0Pr1yPr iiiiiii XX    
As in Maddala (1999) and Greene (2000) we assume the error term
i to be independently and 
identically distributed with mean zero and unit variance,  2,0~  Ni , and utility to be 
random, so that the observed GGAP (or written contract) equals 1 if the profit gained is more 
than from the alternative, )(1 01  iy , otherwise 0, )(0 01  iy . This yields the probit 
model:  
   XXii   Pr
 
3 
where    is the standard normal density,   dZez
z
Z
 

22/1
2
1

.  
The reduced regression form of the probit model is mathematically specified:  
      XFYP 11  
where, Y is the choice made,   is a vector of parameter estimates and X is a vector of 
explanatory variables included in the function. This model is considered parsimonious and 
tractable in structure assuming that utility is maximized, choice sets deterministic and the 
characteristics of the decision maker measurable and that the error term has a simple 
structure (Greene, 2000). We have assumed the normal probability density function because 
the choice to adopt GGAP (or use written contracts) is unknown a priori and estimated probit 
coefficients by maximizing the likelihood function, 
     i
y
i
y
XFXFL
ii
  
 01
1  
where  F is the distribution function of  . The outputs of the models represent the 
probabilities of individuals selecting each alternative.  
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The frequency of contract renewals  
The purpose of this section is to estimate the frequency of contract renewals. Generally 
smallholders produce French beans on a three-three month production cycle per year. The 3-3 
tier system is based on relay production where a crop is planted in planned sequence on 
different plots so that a producer has three crop harvests during the year. Each three month 
period is a season. A buyer who contracts a producer is assured of consistent supplies during 
this season but not guaranteed in the second or third phases of the 3-3 tier season. The 
renewal of a contract for the second phase is assumed given at the end of the first 3 month 
season if the partners are satisfied with the dealings of that forgone season. Otherwise, the 
renewal is terminated. This means that a producer could search for a different buyer during 
the course of the first phase if not interested with renewal with a buyer for the second phase of 
crop harvests. A buyer also has the same option of changing a producer for the coming 
season. We assume that during the actual season there are no withdrawals of business 
dealings.  
We only have data on the number of seasons a producer had sold to a buyer at the time of the 
survey. We assume that there have been renewals and terminations of contracts for a certain 
period of time. This helps us to capture the likelihood that producers and buyers could have 
parted ways at one point and then reconciled in subsequent seasons. This is not uncommon in 
fresh produce markets in the study area. The period is computed as follows: 
3
LLUL
T

  
where T is the time period interval; UL is the maximum number of seasons in the sample; LL
is the minimum number of seasons in the sample and 3 is the three-three month contract 
period per year. This equation returns a value of 6.6 or about 7 years. The observed number of 
seasons is taken as counts or frequency of contract renewals in a 7 year period. Table A.4 
presents descriptive statistics on the reported number of seasons. The minimum number of 
seasons is 0 which means that these producers did not have any contract renewals with the 
buyer in the last 7 years. Producers could change buyers, exit or change into a non-export 
crop etc or buyers could change producers, move to another region, or exit for some seasons 
etc. The relationship between the frequency of contract renewal and covariates could be 
estimated using the canonical regression specification for count variables: the Poisson. The 
Poisson model is a regression of the form, 
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  Niyx iii ,...,1,...,1 ,0, exp    1 
where ix is a vector of covariates, i is the mean of the Poisson distribution,  is the gamma 
function and ,,...,1 Ni  indexes the N observations in a random sample. The model has a 
loglinear conditional mean function that is equal to its conditional variance  
  iiiii xyxyE  |Var]|[  2  
where, iii xyE ]|[ is the conditional mean and   iii xy |Var is the conditional variance. 
However, this assumption is restricted in our data. The mean frequency of contract renewals 
in table A.4, 54.4i  
is lower than the variance 21.18i  indicating non equality of the mean 
and the variance. For example, table A.5 shows that the variances of the frequency of contract 
renewals for price knowledge and payment mode are higher than the means. The mean value 
of the dependent variable appears to vary with when price is known and the type of payment 
mode. These differences further suggest that a Poisson model, in which these values are 
assumed to be equal, could be inappropriate in our analysis. Where observed data displays 
overdispersion i.e., the conditional variance is larger than the conditional mean, a more 
general model, the negative binomial performs better than the Poisson model (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1990: Greene, 2008).  
The negative binomial regression relaxes equidispersion assumption in the Poisson model 
(equation 2) through introduction of latent heterogeneity   in the conditional mean to induce 
overdispersion (Greene, 2008),  
     
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where, error term,  
ii
h exp  is assumed to have a one parameter gamma distribution,   ,G  
with mean 1 and a variance 

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1
 and a probability density function, 
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The latent heterogeneity preserves the conditional mean, iii xyE ]|[ but induces over 
dispersion in the variance, ]1[]
1
1[]|Var[
iiiii
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By integrating out the error term in (4) and transforming the Gamma distribution as a function 
of the Poisson mean, the marginal negative binomial distribution is obtained 
  
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  is the dispersion parameter. Our interest is to estimate, ,  and   parameters. Statistically, 
the estimated coefficients from (3) have an additive effect in the  ylog  scale, 
i
k
j i
xi   

10
)log(  6 
and are interpreted as expected log counts of the frequency of contract renewals. If equation 6 
is expressed in multiplicative form, the results are interpreted as incidence rate ratios, 
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1
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  
  7 
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Table A.1: Compliance with GlobalGAP requirements by farm structure (N=249) 
Upfront Requirements 
% 
Producer 
groups 
(N=100) 
% 
Independent 
producers 
(N=149) 
 
 
 
t-test 
 
 
Sample  
N=249 
Training modules     
Pesticide use, application and control 100 77.2  -5.42 86.4 
Crop and personal hygiene 100 79.2  -5.10 87.6 
Record keeping 100 32.9  -14.23 59.8 
Post harvest crop care 100 16.8  -22.18 50.2 
Farm investments      
Calibrated sprayer 100 93.3  -2.67 96.0 
Own-farm grading shed 98 13.4  -23.42 47.4 
Water pump 97 84.6  -3.20 89.6 
Protective clothing 76 16.1  -11.75 40.2 
Traceability of farm produce     
Producer’s name 98 73.2  -5.41 83.1 
Farm’s code 61 22.8  -6.56 38.2 
Produce collection date 84 55.0  -4.96 66.7 
Produce grade 100 100 - 100 
Producer group name 100 0 - 40.2 
Certification status     
Certified 72 0  -19.5 28.9 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1 Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006 
 
 
  
106 
 
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for GlobalGAP requirements conditional on producer 
group certification status (N=100) 
 Not certified 
group (N-28) 
Certified 
group (N=72)  
 
Upfront Requirements  Mean S. D. Mean S. D. t-test 
Training       
Pesticides use, application and control 1 0 1 0 - 
Crop and personal hygiene 1 0 1 0 - 
Book keeping 1 0 1 0 - 
Post harvest crop care 1 0 1 0 - 
Farm investments       
Calibrated sprayer 1 0 1 0 - 
On-farm grading shed .93 .26 1 0 -2.33 
Water pump .89 .31 1 0 -2.91 
Protective garment .64 .49 .81 .40 -1.72 
Traceability of produce      
Producer group name 1 0 1 0 - 
Produce grade 1 0 1 0 - 
Producer’s name .93 .26 1 0 -2.33 
Farm’s code .89 .31 .5 .50 3.84 
Produce collection date  .79 .42 .86 .35 -.92 
Certification      
Certified  0 0 1 0 - 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006 
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics based on certification status and farm structure (N=249) 
 NCG, n=28 IND, n=149 C-G, n=72 NCG/IND NCG/CG 
Independent 
Variables 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-test t-test 
Age (yrs) 44.46 10.83 40.18 9.22 43.29 7.02 -2.180 0.632 
Schooling(yrs) 10 2.26 9.89 2.26 10.97 2.14 -0.230 -1.993 
Experience(yrs) 12.25 8.45 12.95 6.98 13.57 6.96 0.465  -0.794 
Contract seasons 6.46 4.57 2.58 3.22 8.2 3.9 -5.413 -1.891 
Farm size (acres) .79 .71 .79 .50 1.53 .77 0.071 -4.397 
Grading shed (0,1) .93 .26 .13 .34 1 0 -11.651 -2.330 
Protective gear (0,1) .64 .48 .16 .37 .81 .40 -6.004 -1.719 
Written contract (0,1) 1 0 .05 .23 .58 .49 -22.089 4.302 
Export firm link (0,1) .93 .26 .30 .46 .81 .40 -7.095 1.509 
Group member (0,1) 1 0 0 0 1 0 - - 
Farmers sharing buyer 
(count) 
3.5 1.57 3.4 1.78 3.64 .99 -0.268 -0.523 
Farmers in village 
(count) 
15.43 5.38 19.53 6.55 21.13 8.12 3.106 -3.408 
Groups in village 
(count) 
1.93 1.14 2.62 2.21 2.94 1.68 1.620 -2.929 
Group size (count) 17.32 2.5 0 0 22.31 6.65 -84.310 -3.825 
Mean Price, 3kg 
carton 
74.33 14.15 67.62 25.36 71.49 17 -3.330 1.919 
Extension visits (0,1) 1 0 .26 .44 1 0 -8.990 - 
Extension (count) 10.04 2.83 2.46 4.59 7.76 2.92 -8.410 3.497 
Credit access (0,1) 1 0 .68 .46 1 0 -3.570 - 
NB: NCG-Not certified groups, IND-Independent Producers, CG-Certified groups 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006 
 
 
Figure A.1: Distribution of contract renewals among French beans producers  
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for the frequency of contract renewals 
Distribution of producers N Mean SD Var. Min Max P50 
All sampled producers 249 4.54 4.27 18.21 0 20 5 
Excluding producers with 0 seasons 171 6.61 3.58 12.80 2 20 5 
Excluding producers with 20 seasons 248 4.48 4.16 17.31 0 16 5 
Excluding producers with 0 and 20 seasons 170 6.53 3.44 11.81 2 16 5 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006 
 
Table A.5: Contract renewals conditional on price knowledge and payment mode 
Variable  N Mean Var 
Price known at planting time 80 8 18.18 
Price known at harvesting time 169 2.90 9.92 
Spot cash payment after delivery 83 2.34 13.06 
Lagged payment after delivery 166 5.64 17.23 
Source: Author, computed using STATA 12.1, Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 
2006 
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